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The problem of the liability of the seller of a product to the
ultimate user first entered California in 1896, with the case of Lewis v.
Terry.1 The upright end of a folding bed manufactured by the
defendant fell in upon the plaintiff as she was about to retire for the
night, and broke her arm. At that time there was a well established
general rule, mistakenly2 derived from the old English case of
Winterbottom v. Wright,3 that the seller of any chattel was not liable
to the consumer even for negligence, unless there was privity of
contract between them. To this rule, over half a century, two more or
less generally recognized exceptions had developed in other
jurisdictions. One was that if the seller knew that the chattel was
dangerous, and failed to disclose it, he became liable in tort for
"something like fraud" upon the consumer.4 The other was that if the
chattel fell into a vaguely undefined category of "inherently" or
"imminently" dangerous articles, which at least included drugs, food
and drink, explosives and firearms, a tort duty arose toward the
ultimate user to exercise reasonable care to protect him. In the Lewis
case the first of these exceptions was sufficiently pleaded in the
'This article was first published in 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966). For citation purposes,
please refer to the original source of the material.
*Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. 111 Cal. 39,43 Pac. 398 (1896).
2. One of the important contributions of the late Professor Francis H. Bohlen was the
laying of this ghost in Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44
AM. L. REV. (N.S.) 209, 280-85, 289-310 (1905). See also Lord Atkin, in Donoghue v.
Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562,588-89.
3. 10 M. & W. 109,152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
4. The earliest case, Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837),
affirmed in 4 M. & W. 337, 150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (Ex. 1838), involved express
misrepresentation as to the safety of a gun, and liability was rested on deceit. Later
decisions, such as Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892), and
Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903), found negligence in
non-disclosure.
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complaint, and the court approved and adopted it in reversing an
order sustaining a demurrer. Subsequent cases agreed.
5
This was the progenitor of all of the law on liability to the
consumer in California. The second exception, as to "inherent" or
"imminent" danger, received acceptance in 1916,6 and a third, as to
violation of a safety statute or regulation, was added at a considerably
later date.7 But until well after 1930, it remained the definite
California rule that unless the case could be brought within one of the
exceptions, there was no liability without privity even for negligence.8
In 1916 there came in New York the historic decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,9 in which Cardozo enlarged the
"inherent danger" exception to swallow up the general rule. If, he
said, the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger, and the manufacturer is under a duty of reasonable care to
make it safe. The effect of this, with later decisions, was to expand the
class of goods as to which the duty was owed to include all products.
Over a period of some forty years the case swept the country, and it is
no longer seriously challenged anywhere.10 California, however, was
not one of the early jurisdictions to follow it. Acceptance was
foreshadowed in 1932,11 but the first case to declare definite approval
of the new rule was Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co.12 in 1934,
where a workman was injured by the collapse of a defective rung of a
ladder. Later cases' 3 in this state have put it beyond dispute that all
sellers of all chattels are subject to negligence liability, to all those
who may foreseeably be expected to suffer injury if the goods are
dangerously defective.
5. Baker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936); see Cliff v.
California Spray Chem. Co., 83 Cal. App. 424, 257 Pac. 99 (1927); and cf. Tingey v. E. F.
Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947); Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App.
2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1963).
6. See Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (1916).
7. Quirici v. Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 219 P.2d 897 (1950); Di Muro v.
Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 784, 14 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1961).
8. Cliff v. California Spray Chem. Co., 83 Cal. App. 424, 257 Pac. 99 (1927); see
Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (1916).
9. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10. Indiana, about which there was really little doubt, falls definitely into line with J. I.
Case Co. v. Sandefur, 245 Ind. 213, 197 N.E.2d 519 (1964). Mississippi, apparently the last
state to hold out, overthrew the requirement of privity in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges,
189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), and in the process went all the way to strict liability in tort.
11. In Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733,7 P.2d 1013 (1932).
12. 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934). The vacated opinion of the District Court of
Appeal is in 22 P.2d 727 (Cal. App. 1933). The first opinion of the supreme court is in 28
P.2d 29 (Cal. 1934). This was withdrawn in favor of a reversal for error in instructions.
13. See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
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The rule of strict liability, without privity and without negligence,
began in other jurisdictions with cases of defective food and drink.
14 It
came as the aftermath of a prolonged and violent national agitation
over defective food,15 and the first decisions16 followed immediately
upon the heels of the political overturn of 1912. There was
considerable historical support for the idea that the seller of food
incurred a more or less undefined special responsibility to the
immediate purchaser, which nineteenth-century cases had called a
special implied warranty. 7 In extending this special responsibility to
the consumer who was not in privity, the courts initially were a great
deal more clear as to the result to be achieved than as to any theory
which would support it; and for another fourteen years there was
resort to a remarkable variety of highly ingenious, and equally
unconvincing, notions of fictitious agencies, third-party beneficiary
contract, and the like, plucked out of thin air as devices to get around
the fact that there was no contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant. 8 Finally, in 1927 the Mississippi court came up with the
idea of a "warranty" running with the goods from the manufacturer to
the consumer, by analogy to a contract running with the land. For
more than thirty years after that date, until Justice Traynor upset the
apple cart in 1963, the strict liability continued to be identified with
warranty, which was necessarily a warranty without a contract.
This was attended by numerous difficulties. "Warranty" had
become so closely identified with contract in the minds of nearly all
courts and lawyers that contract rules were assumed necessarily to
apply to it. Traditionally it required that the plaintiff should act in
reliance upon some express or implied representation or assurance, or
some promise or undertaking, given him by the defendant; and this
was quite often impossible to make out when the consumer did not
even know the name of the maker. Warranties on the sale of goods
were governed in most states by the Uniform Sales Act, which had
been drawn in 1906 when there was no such thing as a warranty to a
14. The history is traced in brief outline in Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-10 (1960).
15. Narrated in Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drug Legislation, 1 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1933).
16. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); Parks v. C. C. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman,
106 Miss. 864,64 So. 791 (1914).
17. See DICKERSON, PRODUCrS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 26 (1951);
MELICK, SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK 10 (1936); Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source
of Liability, 5 IOWA L. BULL. 6 (1919).
18. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 153-55 (1957), has
collected no less than twenty-nine such devices, which in the aggregate present a truly
fascinating picture of judges determined to arrive at a destination over any available route,
no matter how impassable.
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third person; and a good deal of its language spoke exclusively in
terms of the immediate parties to the sale, with a specific provision
that there were no implied warranties of quality except as set forth in
the Act. The buyer was required to give notice to the seller of the
breach of warranty within a reasonable time after he knew or ought
to have known of it. Furthermore, any liability founded upon a
warranty was subject to disclaimer in advance by the seller. There
were other minor obstacles, no longer worthy of mention.19
Altogether the non-contractual "warranty" in the food cases proved
to be ill-adapted to the purpose, and called for a great deal of judicial
ingenuity. This, however, did not prevent the gradual spread of the
food rule, until by 1960 it had been accepted by a clear majority of the
courts that had considered the question.20 What became reasonably
clear in the process was that the "warranty" was not the one made on
the original sale, and did not run with the goods, but was a new and
independent one made directly to the consumer;2l that it did not arise
out of or depend upon any contract, but was imposed by law, in tort,
as a matter of policy;22 and that it was subject to rules of its own.
Although there were two earlier decisions23 in which the end was
accomplished virtually without discussion, the California court first
came to grips with the warranty of food to the consumer in Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co.24 in 1939. A ham and cheese sandwich,
19. For fuller discussion, see Prosser, supra note 14, at 1124-34.
20. These courts are listed in Prosser, supra note 14, at 1106-10.
21. See Madourous v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S.W.2d 445 (1936); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Le Blanc v.
Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958); Worley v. Procter
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
22. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Griggs
Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942); La Hue v. Coca Cola Bottling,
Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269
P.2d 413 (1954); Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094
(1957); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117,74 N.E.2d 162 (1947).
Compare, in California: Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d
163 (1954) (tort statute of limitations applied); Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App. 2d 442, 139
P.2d 86 (1943) (tort rule as to survival); Singley v. Bigelow, 108 Cal, App. 436, 291 Pac. 899
(1930) (same); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955)
(warranty sounds in tort for insurance purposes).
23. In Binion v. Sasaki, 5 Cal. App. 2d 15, 41 P.2d 585 (1935), the wife of the ultimate
purchaser was denied recovery on a warranty. But in Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co.,
4 Cal. 2d 206, 47 P.2d 708 (1935), recovery was allowed in a similar case without
discussion. And in Jensen v. Berris, 31 Cal. App. 2d 537, 88 P.2d 220 (1939), one of a party
in a restaurant who did not himself buy the food was allowed to recover, with a refusal to
discriminate between members of the group.
24. 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
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manufactured by the defendant, proved to be full of maggots. It was
sold by an establishment inappropriately named the Happy Daze
Buffet to a purchaser, who gave it to his wife. She swallowed a bite of
it, discovered the source of the peculiar taste, and was understandably
made quite ill. Justice Houser would have been quite willing to find
an agency to buy for her, or even a third-party beneficiary contract;25
but he preferred, in the light of the food cases in other states, to
construe away the language of the Uniform Sales Act.26 "Buyer," he
declared, as used in the statute, did not require any privity of contract
in food cases, and was not limited to the first purchaser, or even to a
later one, but must be held to include any ultimate consumer.27 There
can be little doubt that the original draftsmen of the Act would have
been considerably startled, if not dismayed, by such an interpretation
of their handiwork, and it can only be characterized as a piece of
judicial legerdemain. The decision was followed in a series of later
California cases involving food and drink,28 in all of which it was
assumed that the strict liability was a matter of warranty, based upon
and governed by the Sales Act.
The extension of this strict liability beyond food for human
consumption began with animal food,29 and then with what might be
called products for intimate bodily use but external application, such
as hair dye,30 permanent wave solutions3' and cigarettes.32 For a good
25. Id. at 284, 93 P.2d at 805.
26. "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." 1 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. § 15(1) (1950); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1735(1). This provision is now replaced by
§ 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
27. "In adopting the statute here concerned as a part of the Uniform Sales Act, it was
the clear intent of the legislature that, with respect to foodstuffs, the implied warranty
provision therein contained should inure to the benefit of any ultimate purchaser or
consumer of food; and that it was not intended that a strict 'privity of contract' would be
essential for the bringing of an action by such ultimate consumer for an asserted breach of
the implied warranty." 14 Cal. 2d at 283, 93 P.2d at 804.
28. Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945); Rubino v.
Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18,266 P.2d 163 (1954); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger
Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing
Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961); Hampton v. Gebhardt's Chili
Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1961).
29. McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (dog food); Midwest Game
Co. v, M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959) (fish food).
30. Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68,269 P.2d 413 (1954).
31. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958)
(permanent wave solution); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265,
149 N.E.2d 181 (1958) (same); Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio
App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954) (soap); Worley
v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (detergent
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many years California, 33 in company with other jurisdictions,34 refused
to go beyond this. The real breakthrough 35 came in Michigan in 1958,
with Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,3 6 in
which Justice Voelker found a warranty from the manufacturer to the
user of cinder building blocks, which by no stretch of the imagination
would be regarded as intended for any bodily use, or as "inherently
dangerous." This was immediately taken up by several other courts,
37
and the restriction as to food went overboard. In 1960 there came in
New Jersey the landmark decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,38 which entered into the first full discussion of the rule,
and held the manufacturer and the retailer of an automobile to a
warranty of safety to the ultimate driver. The citadel of privity fell.
What followed was unquestionably the most sudden and spectacular
overturn of a well-established rule of law in the entire history of the
law of torts.39 The latest count of the jurisdictions40 finds strict liability
coming in contact with hands); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961)
(same).
32. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). Cf.
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (poliomyelitis
vaccine); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (clothing); Bowles v. Zimmer
Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin for setting bone fracture).
33. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (insecticide);
Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955) (ceiling joist);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941) (hot water bottle); Young
v. Aeroil Prod. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957) (portable elevator).
34. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 327 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. App. 1959) (automobile); Odom v.
Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320,95 S.E.2d 601 (1956) (tractor); Jordan v. Worthington Pump
& Mach. Co., 73 Ariz. 329,241 P.2d 433 (1952) (pump); Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash.
2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945) (antifreeze compound); Jordan v. Brouwer, 86 Ohio App. 505,
93 N.E.2d 49 (1949) (same); Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8
(1953) (electric blanket); Burgess v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 264 F.2d 495 (10th Cir.
1959) (ladder).
35. The first case, involving a grinding wheel, was Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 46
Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ct. C.P. 1951), which was overruled by Wood v. General
Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953). Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299
(Fla. 1956), talked implied warranty of an aluminum rocking chair, but apparently was
disposed of on negligence.
36. 353 Mich. 120,90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
37. Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40
(Fla. App. 1958) (electric cable); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir.
1959) (tire); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959)
(automobile); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(airplane); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959) (house trailer, with
sweeping dictum as to all products).
38. 32 N.J. 358,161 A.2d 69 (1960).
39. The only remotely comparable overturn was the reversal of the rule denying
recovery for prenatal injuries, following Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
See PROSSER, TORTS 355-56 (3d ed. 1964).
So rapid was the change that § 402 A of the Second Restatement of Torts, dealing
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from the manufacturer to the consumer the accepted rule, on one
theory or another, as to all products in a heavy majority of the courts,
with only eleven 41 still insisting upon privity or negligence, and only
two 42 reiterating such a position in any decision since the avalanche
started with the Henningsen case.
Among the first rush of cases was Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.
in California, which forecast pretty clearly the future law of the state.
An employee of a corporation was injured by the bursting of a grind-
ing wheel made by the defendant. The District Court of Appeal43 dis-
carded privity as in the food cases, and allowed recovery on the basis
with the strict liability, was drawn three times. As first submitted to and approved by the
American Law Institute in 1961 (Tentative Draft No. 6), it was limited to food for human
consumption. As again approved in 1962 (Tentative Draft No. 7), it was expanded to
include any product intended for intimate bodily use. The final version, adopted in 1964
(Tentative Draft No. 10) extended to all products.
40. The jurisdictions are classified in Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv.
791,795-98 (1966). To avoid lengthy repetition, only the following summary of the state of
the law as of January 1, 1967, will be given here, with citations not included in the
Minnesota article:
Twenty-two courts now accept the strict liability as to all products: Arizona
(probably), California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Tennessee, Washington (apparently). Mississippi, Nevada, and Oklahoma have
been added since the publication of the Minnesota article. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges,
189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Shoshoni Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski (Nev. no. 5112,
Dec. 7, 1966) - P.2d -- ; Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1955).
The last word from Pennsylvania, in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 215, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), is in
accord, although Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383,221 A.2d 320 (1966), handed down the same
day, adhered to the former rule which applied the limitation of the Uniform Commercial
Code to purchasers and members of their households. The Webb case relies on the
dissenting opinion in the Miller case.
In three jurisdictions federal courts, guessing at state law, have concluded that the
liability will be accepted: Indiana, Kansas, Vermont.
One court has intimated, without holding, that it will accept it: Wisconsin.
In five states it has been adopted by statute: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Virginia,
Wyoming. A statute was adopted in Georgia, but it has been repealed.
In two states the development has not gone beyond products for intimate bodily use:
Hawaii, Louisiana (both federal decisions).
In six it has not gone beyond food: Nebraska, Puerto Rico, Utah (see Schneider v.
Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35,327 P.2d 822 (1958)). There are food statutes in Montana, South
Carolina, and Rhode Island (R.I. LAWS 1960, tit. 6A, § 2-315). The Texas Courts of Civil
Appeals are in disagreement, but the supreme court has not yet gone beyond food,
although federal decisions have done so.
41. Delaware, Georgia (statute repealed), Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico (by implication in Phares v. Sandia Lumber Co., 62 N.M.
90,305 P.2d 367 (1956)), North Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia (dictum).
No law has been found in Alaska.
42. Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964); Henry v.
John W. Eshelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965).
43. 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959).
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of a warranty. The opinion was vacated when the supreme court
granted a hearing;44 but this did not prevent a federal court in New
York from relying upon it as established California law in finding a
warranty from the manufacturer of an airplane to a passenger.45 The
California supreme court was unwilling to go so far, and instead dealt
with the particular case by resorting to the expedient of stretching
"privity" to the breaking point, on the basis that the sale was made to
a corporation, and so it must necessarily have been intended that the
wheel would be used by some employee.
46
Shortly after 1960 there were important developments in the way
of theory. Although the writer was perhaps the first to voice it,47 the
suggestion had always been sufficiently obvious that the warranty,
which was not really a warranty at all, and never had been anything
more than a transparent device to achieve the desired objective, was
not only unnecessary but undesirable. No one denied that the
"warranty" was a matter of strict liability. No one disputed that in the
absence of any contract between the parties, the liability must lie in
tort. Why not, then, jettison the contract word, and talk merely of
strict liability in tort, declared in its own right-a concept familiar
enough to all lawyers in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous
activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, respondeat superior,
defamation, and even misrepresentation? The American Law
Institute, considering a first draft of a new section to be added to the
Second Restatement of Torts, accepted this proposal, and finally
emerged with a section that stated the strict liability without making
use of "warranty" at all:
§ 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby causedto the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
44. For the benefit of any readers outside of California, it should be explained again
that under the peculiar procedure in this state, a hearing by the supreme court is on appeal
de novo from the trial court. The opinion of the District Court of Appeals is vacated and
stricken from the record. It is not officially published, and becomes as if never written. It is
considered a breach of etiquette for counsel to cite such an opinion, at least without
stating that it is vacated.
45. Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
46. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575
(1960).
47. Prosser, supra note 14, at 1134.
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without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa ration
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
A comment:4 was added to this section to make it clear that there
was nothing in the rule stated to prevent any court from
characterizing it as a matter of "warranty"; but that if so, it must be
recognized that such a warranty was of a very different kind from
those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it would not be
subject to the various contract rules which had grown up to surround
such sales.
The first case in the country to adopt this approach was
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,49 in California in 1962. The
plaintiff was injured when a combination power tool, which could be
used as a saw, drill, or wood lathe, proved to be defective and let fly a
piece of wood, which struck him in the head. He brought action
against the manufacturer, from whom he had not bought the tool. In
the way of his recovery stood not only the California refusal to extend
the "warranty" without privity beyond food, but also the plaintiff's
failure to give timely notice of the breach as required by the Uniform
Sales Act.50 Justice Traynor met these obstacles by saying that this
was not really a matter of warranty at all, but of strict liability in
tort.51 The prior talk of "warranty" in the food cases, and the
application of the definitions in the Sales Act, were explained away as
a matter of convenience of the court, in that the definitions had
provided appropriate standards to be adopted under the particular
circumstances.5 2 The requirement of notice was not an appropriate
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965).
49. 59 Cal. 2d 57,27 Cal. Rptr. 697,377 P.2d 897 (1963).
50. "But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of
the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or
ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor." 1A UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. § 49 (1950); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1769. This has now been replaced by § 2-607 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
51. "Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an
express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the
abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the
liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law... and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products.., make
clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law
of strict liability in tort." 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
52. "It is true that in many of these situations the court has invoked the sales act
definitions of warranties (Civ. Code §§ 1732, 1735) in defining the defendant's liability, but
it has done so, not because the statutes so required, but because they provided appropriate
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one, and it would not be applied.53 Warranty rules developed in
commercial transactions were not to govern. 
54
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that
plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a
way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and
manufacture of which the plaintiff was not aware that made the
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.
55
The Greenman case has now been followed by several decisions
in California,56 and it was promptly accepted by other courts as the
solution of their difficulties.57 Strict liability in tort already appears to
be sweeping the country. There is no reason to doubt that this is
destined to rank as the leading case in the final phase of the long
development of products liability.
In support of the decision, Justice Traynor made brief reference
to two justifications, which had been advanced for a number of years
standards for the court to adopt under the circumstances presented." Id. at 61, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 699-700,377 P.2d at 899-900.
53. Id. at 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
54. "Accordingly, rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to
meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the
manufacturer's liability to those injured by its defective products unless those rules also
serve the purpose for which such liability is imposed." Id. at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377
P.2d at 901.
55. Id. at 64,27 Cal. Rptr. at 701,377 P.2d at 901.
56. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964) (automobile); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr.
754 (1963) (surface preparer); Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (1964) (concrete cutting machine); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal.
App, 2d 44,46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965) (dynamite); see Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d
9,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965) (truck).
57. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (New York law); Putnam v.
Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (Texas law); Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (Louisiana law); Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber
Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana law); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp.
427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 290, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), affirming 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201
N.E.2d 313 (1964); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965);
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Jabukowski v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (App. Div. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 42 NJ. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick,
C.C.H. PRODS. LIAB. REP. 5501 (Okla. 1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore.
301,405 P.2d 624 (1965); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 215, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); McMillen Feeds,
Inc. of Texas v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also State Stove Mfg.
Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241,
382 P.2d 399 (1963); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374,205 N.E.2d 92
(1965), affirmed on the ground of warranty, 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1963) ("'strict tort liability' (surely a more
accurate phrase)").
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by legal writers. One was that by placing the machine on the market
the maker had impliedly represented that it was safe for use, and the
plaintiff had purchased and used it in reliance upon that
representation.58 The other was the policy argument, which Justice
Traynor himself had advocated before,59 and which be was later to
repeat,6° that the losses due to defective products should be placed
upon the manufacturer, for the reason that he is in the better position
to insure against the liability, and to distribute it to the public by
adding the cost of such insurance to the price of his product. This
"risk distribution" argument has received little mention in the
decisions outside of California, 61 probably because it embarks upon a
broad theory of "enterprise liability" from which the courts thus far
have tended to shy away. As the Oregon court has pointed out,62 the
58. "Implicit in the machine's presence on the market, however, was a representation
that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built. Under these circumstances, it should
not be controlling whether plaintiff selected the machine because of the statements in the
brochure, or because of the machine's own appearance of excellence that belied the defect
lurking beneath the surface, or because he merely assumed that it would safely do the jobs
it was built to do." 59 Cal. 2d at 64,27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
59. "Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury
can be insured by the manufacturer, and distributed among the people as a cost of doing
business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects
that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the
market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may
cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the
product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries
may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a
constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant
protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection." Traynor, J.,
concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944).
"The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Traynor, J.,
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr., 697, 701, 377
P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
60. "The rationale of that [Greenman] case does not rest on the analysis of the
financial strength or bargaining power of the parties to the particular action. It rests,
rather, on the proposition that 'The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business.' [Citing the concurring opinion in the Escola case.]" Traynor, C.J., in Seely
v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,18,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,23,403 P.2d 145,151 (1965).
61. Judge Wisdom approved it in Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19
(5th Cir. 1963), and it received a line in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
62. "The rationale of risk spreading and compensating the victim has no special
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argument would be no less applicable to an injury inflicted without
fault by the manufacturer's delivery truck. However that may be, the
two justifications obviously rest upon quite different grounds; and it
appears inevitable that the California courts will be confronted with a
choice between them.
63
It would be easy to overestimate the importance of the shift of
theory in the Greenman case. It is warranty that has gone overboard,
and with it all idea that the plaintiff's recovery is founded on a
contract, as well as the statutory provisions of the Sales Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code. In particular it is the defenses, such as
lack of notice to the seller and disclaimers, which are out of the
window. The substance of the liability itself remains unchanged. The
cases of warranty, whether on a direct sale between the parties or to
the consumer without privity, are still important precedents in
determining what it is that the seller has undertaken to deliver.64
With warranty laid to rest, what remains in California for the
consumer who is not in privity of contract with the defendant is the
strict liability in tort, together with the old MacPherson liability for
negligence. The latter may quite possibly support recovery in a few
occasional cases65 to which the strict liability does not extend.
Because of the many uncertainties surrounding unfamiliar law,
relevancy to cases involving injuries resulting from the use of defective goods. The
reasoning would seem to apply not only in cases involving personal injuries arising from
the sale of defective goods, but equally to any case where an injury results from the risk
creating conduct of the seller in any stage of the production and distribution of goods.
Thus a manufacturer would be strictly liable even in the absence of fault for an injury to a
person struck by one of the manufacturer's trucks being used in transporting his goods to
market. It seems to us that the enterprise liability rationale employed in the Escola case
proves too much and that if adopted would compel us to apply the principle of strict
liability in all future cases where the loss could be distributed.
"Although we believe that it is the function of the judiciary to modify the law of torts
to fit the changing needs of society, we feel that the judicial extension of the theory of
strict liability to all cases where it is convenient for those engaged in commerce to spread
the risk would not be advisable. If enterprise liability is to be so extended, there is a strong
argument for limiting the victim's measure of recovery to some scheme of compensation
similar to that employed in workmen's compensation. The legislature alone has the power
to set up such a compensation scheme. The court cannot put a limit upon the jury's
verdict." O'Connell, J., in Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 309-10, 405 P.2d
624,628-29 (1965).
63. See text accompanying note 135 infra.
64. "Although the rules of warranty frustrate rational compensation for physical
injury, they function well in a commercial setting.... These rules determine the quality of
the product the manufacturer promises and thereby determine the quality he must
deliver." Traynor, C.J., in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22,
403 P.2d 145, 150 (1965).
65. Perhaps, for example, as to products unavoidably dangerous (see text
accompanying notes 78-96 infra), and injuries to bystanders (text accompanying notes
135-142 infra).
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negligence is still commonly pleaded as an alternative basis for
recovery, and so may be expected to appear in the decisions for a
good many years to come; but there will obviously be few instances in
which it will accomplish anything that the strict liability does not.
The rest of this discussion will consist of a review of the
California decisions as to both negligence and strict liability, with
some speculation as to what the court may do about questions with
which it has not yet been faced.
66
What Products?
The negligent seller of any product is clearly liable for any
foreseeable harm it may do to the ultimate user. Any idea of a
possible limitation to products which, even if negligently made, are
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous disappeared in the
nineteen-forties. 67 The recovery in a number of cases68 of damage to
property makes it clear that it is no longer required, if indeed it ever
was, that the product be foreseeably dangerous to human safety. The
liability clearly extends to the negligent design of a product,69 and to
failure to give a proper warning of known dangers attendant upon its
anticipated use.7°
So far as strict liability is concerned, there can be no doubt that it
applies to all kinds of products,71 and that whatever restrictions there
may have been in the past as to food and drink, intimate bodily use,
or a high degree of danger, are now of purely historical interest. The
66. There is unavoidable duplication of much that is said in Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
67. Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942) (chair); Hale v. Depaoli, 33
Cal. 2d 228,201 P.2d 1 (1948) (porch railing); Larramendy v. Myers, 126 Cal. App. 2d 636,
272 P.2d 824 (1954) (smoke-producing device for dancing act).
68. Kolberg v. Sherwin Williams Co., 98 Cal. App. 609, 269 Pac. 975 (1928); Quirici v.
Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 219 P.2d 897 (1950); Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip.
Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464,227 P.2d 923 (1951); Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App.
2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345
(1961); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963); Mack v.
Hugh W. Comstock Associates, 225 Cal. App. 2d 583, 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964).
69. Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (1958);
Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962). But a seller who
makes a product to the buyer's design is not liable to another when the product is properly
made and the injury is due to the design. Krentz v. Union Carbide Corp., 365 F.2d 113
(6th Cir. 1966).
70. Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947); Briggs v.
National Indus., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949); Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108
Cal. App. 2d 303,239 P.2d 48 (1951); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855,
32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
71. See cases cited note 56 supra.
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later decisions72 apparently have given final interment to the rather
metaphysical distinction between the product sold and its container,
which formerly appeared as an element of confusion in the food
cases.73 There are, however, two problems with which the California
courts may yet have difficulty.
One of these concerns products which are expected to be
processed, or otherwise altered, after they have left the seller and
before they reach the consumer. Because of the dearth of cases, the
Restatement has left the question open in a caveat.74 By way of
comment, it has suggested that the problem is one of whether the
responsibility for discovery and remedy of the danger is shifted to the
intermediate handler, which will turn in part at least upon the
reasonable expectation that he will take care of it.7 The seller of raw
pork, which is expected to be cooked before it is made into sausage, is
certainly not to be held liable when it is packed half raw into the
casings.76 On the other hand, if raw coffee beans are sold to a buyer
who is to do no more than roast, grind and pack them, it cannot be
supposed that the seller will escape the liability when they are
contaminated with arsenic or some other poison. The nature of the
defect and the degree of danger are no doubt important, and so is the
relation of the parties; and undoubtedly there are some defects as to
which the responsibility cannot be shifted. The maker of an
automobile with a defective steering gear, or a leak in the hydraulic
brake line, can have no hope of relief from his responsibility by
reason of the fact that the car is sold to a dealer who is expected to
service it, adjust the brakes, mount the tires, and the like, before it is
ready for use.
77
The second, and more important, question concerns products
that are in themselves unavoidably dangerous. Whiskey is such a
product. It causes a variety of calamities, from cirrhosis of the liver to
drunken driving, and its widely publicized evils were the foundation
of a political party that is still in existence. Butter, according to the
72. Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963);
Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Jones
v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961). Compare,
as to direct sales, Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814
(1963); Lai Wum Chin Mock v. Belfast Beverages, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 2d 770, 14 Cal. Rptr.
602 (1961).
73. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Gordon v.
Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514,203 P.2d 522 (1949).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, caveat (2) (1965).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment p.
76. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958),
77. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,37 Cal. Rptr. 896,391 P.2d 168
(1964), and text infra, at notes 174-78.
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latest medical theory, is such a product; it deposits cholesterol in the
arteries and brings on heart attacks. The whole pharmacopoeia is full
of drugs,78 such as rabies vaccine, which are not safe and, in the
present state of expert knowledge, cannot be made safe, no matter
how carefully they are manufactured and administered. New and
valuable ones are flooding continuously upon the market, whose
dangers, as was the case with penicillin and cortisone, cannot be
known until experience has demonstrated them. Where only
negligence is in question, the answer as to such products is a simple
one. The utility and social value of the thing sold clearly outweighs
the known, and all the more so the unknown risk, and there is no
negligence in marketing the product. But what is to be the rule as to
strict liability? Does the maker of whiskey, butter, the drug, or even
an automobile, become automatically responsible for all the harm
that such things do in the world? It was undoubtedly to forestall such
a possibility that the Restatement 79 limited its new section to products
"in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer."
It is here that the warranty cases, whether upon a direct sale to
the user or without privity, furnish something of a guide. There are
first of all the cases of defects regarded as "natural" to the product, or
as it is sometimes put, reasonably to be expected to be found in it,
such as a fishbone in fish served in a restaurant, or a cherry pit in a
piece of cherry pie,80 for which all the courts consistently have refused
78. In Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76,32 N.E.2d 729 (1941), recovery was
denied because the plaintiff was informed of the risk and assumed it. As to the drug
problem generally, see Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's
Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 947 (1964); Spangenberg, Aspects of Warranties Relating to
Defective Prescription Drugs, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 194 (1965); Notes, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
515 (1963); 13 STAN. L. REV. 645 (1961); 65 YALE LJ. 262 (1955).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965).
80. Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936) (chicken bone in
chicken pie); Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (1938) (turkey
bone in roast turkey); Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955)
(fishbone in fish dish); Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d
309 (1964) (fishbone in fish chowder); Wieland v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 223 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1955) (chicken bone in chicken fricassee); Norris v. Pig 'N Whistle Sandwich Shop, 79
Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949) (fragment of bone in meat sandwich); Goodwin v.
Country Club, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944) (bone in creamed chicken); Brown v.
Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (sliver of bone in pork chops); Courter v.
Dilbert Bros., 19 Misc. 2d 935, 186 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (piece of prune pit in
prune butter); Adams v. The Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92
(1960) (crystallized grain of corn in corn flakes); Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164
N.E.2d 167 (1960) (small bit of shell in fried oysters); Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,
178 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 1965) (cherry pit in cherry pie); Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus
Enterprises, 415 P.2d 13 (Ore. 1966) (same).
Otherwise when the defect is not reasonably to be expected in the product sold.
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to find strict liability. There are other cases that have come to a
similar conclusion as to such things as cement, with its unavoidable
danger of injury if it comes in contact with the person.81 There are
also numerous cases dealing with allergies, in which the rule has been
worked out that if the product is reasonably safe for the normal user
the seller does not become liable for the harm to the abnormal one.
8 2
If he is, or should be, aware that a substantial number of the
prospective consumers will be allergic to the ingredients, even though
they represent only a small percentage of the total population, be is
required to give due warning of the danger; 83 and no doubt if the
warning is not given the product is to be considered unsafe and there
will be strict liability.84 But if it is given the defendant does not
become liable merely because he has sold the thing at all.
The cases of hepatitis resulting from blood transfusions all have
held that the supplier of the blood is not strictly liable on a warranty,
Arnaud's Restaurant v. Cotter, 212 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954) (piece of crab shell in
pompano en papillotte); Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods Mfrs., Inc., 322 Ill. App. 586, 54 N.E.2d
759 (1944) (bone in noodle soup mix); Lore v. De Simone Bros., 12 Misc. 2d 174, 172
N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (bone in sausage); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.,
345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942) (large piece of shell in oysters); Wood v. Waldorf System,
Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951) (chicken bone in chicken soup); Betehia v. Cape Cod
Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323,103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (chicken bone in chicken sandwich).
81. Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956); Katz v.
Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200,151 A.2d 731 (1959); Baker v. Stewart Sand
& Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App. 1961); Imperial v. Central Concrete, Inc., 1
App. Div. 2d 671, 146 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1955), affd mem. 2 N.Y.2d 939, 142 N.E.2d 209
(1957); Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946,227 P.2d 173 (1961).
82. Zager v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (1939); Stanton v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell
& Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A.2d 650 (1939); Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 340
Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960); Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149
N.E.2d 635 (1958); Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E.2d 404 (1946);
Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941); Cleary v. John M.
Maris Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 120
Utah 474,235 P.2d 525 (1951); see Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392
(1955).
83. Briggs v. National Indus., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542,207 P.2d 110 (1949); Wright v.
Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Hungerholt v. Land 0' Lakes Creameries,
Inc., 209 F. Supp. 177 (D. Minn. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1963); Taylor v.
Newcomb Baking Co., 317 Mass. 609, 59 N.E.2d 293 (1945); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co.,
312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162
A.2d 513 (1960); Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939);
Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913); Zirpola v. Adams Hat
Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21,4 A.2d 73 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939). Cf. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108
Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951); Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179
P.2d 807 (1947).
84. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965);
Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855,32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
STRICT LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER
usually on the rather shaky grounds5 that the transfusion itself is not a
sale but a "service. '8 6 There are, however, a few cases of remote
suppliers that have refused to find strict liability;s7 and the stress laid
in all of the decisions upon the unavoidability of the risk appears
definitely to suggest that this is the real reason for the conclusion.88
There are even two or three late cases89 that have rejected strict
liability as to one new and largely experimental drug, which proved to
have such disastrous side-effects that it had to be withdrawn from the
market.
The conclusion would be clearly indicated that, provided that the
product, so far as is known at the time of the sale, is reasonably safe
for its intended use, there is no liability for unavoidable dangers-if it
were not for the state of confusion surrounding the question of lung
cancer from smoking cigarettes. There are two federal decisions9° that
have denied strict liability on the part of the manufacturer, on the
ground that at the time of sale the danger could not have been
known. There is one91 which, by a two-to-one vote,92 found not only
85. It may be suggested that the hospital normally bills the blood as a separate item,
and there is no more difficulty in finding a sale than in the case of food prepared in its
kitchen.
86. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Dibblee v.
Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v.
Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Sloneker v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964).
87. Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd mem. 280
App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood
Bank, 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23
Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964); Whitehursh v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App.
326,402 P.2d 584 (1965).
88. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REv. 363, 367-68 (1965). In Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d
749 (Fla. App. 1966), the court found a sale of the blood, but refused to impose strict
liability because the defect was unavoidable.
89. Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Lewis
v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400 (Ore. 1966); McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla.
1965). In Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Ill. 1964), allegations
in the complaint were held to be sufficient.
The drug in question was known as MER-29, the formula nowhere stated. It had been
developed experimentally, and found effective in the reduction of cholesterol in the blood;
but after it was marketed the reports were that it was causing eye cataracts, and it was
withdrawn from the market. According to the A.T.L.A. News Letter for April, 1966, p.
101, more than 350 cases involving this drug were pending in New York City alone.
In accord, as to another drug is Cockran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904 (Ore. 1966). See,
however, Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966), where the
facts as to knowledge are not clear.
90. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (Louisiana
law); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (Missouri law).
91. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)
(Pennsylvania law). On a second trial the jury found for the defendant, and this was again
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an express warranty, but also an "implied warranty" to the consumer,
that all cigarettes were safe to smoke. There is still another in which
the Fifth Circuit first put the wrong question to the supreme court of
Florida,93 and then, assuming what apparently has turned out to be
the wrong answer to the right one,94 left the issue to a jury,95 which
disposed of it by finding for the defendant. 96 There the matter rests. It
may be unfortunate that these cases dealt at this time with an issue
about which there has been so much popular outcry as lung cancer
from smoking; and one may at least question whether the last two
decisions would have gone the same way if another product, such as
whiskey or ether, had been involved.
What Defendants?
The negligence liability in California has been extended not only
to the manufacturer of the whole product, but also to the maker of a
component part,97 and to an assembler of parts supplied by others.98
reversed, for error in instructing on assumption of risk, when there was no evidence that
plaintiff was aware of the risk. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d
Cir. 1965).
92. Goodrich, J., concurred specially as to express warranty, but refused to go along
with the implied warranty, and asked about other products, such as whiskey.
93. It was first held that a verdict for the defendant must be sustained, on the basis of a
special answer of the jury, that at the time of sale the defendant could not reasonably have
known that the cigarettes would cause cancer. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d
70 (5th Cir. 1962). Counsel then persuaded the court to put to the supreme court of
Florida, the question whether the fact that the defendant could not have known the
product was dangerous would prevent an implied warranty under Florida law.
"We conclude also that the question thus framed does not present for our
consideration the issue of whether the cigarettes which caused a cancer in this particular
instance were as a matter of law unmerchantable in Florida under the stated conditions,
nor does it request a statement of the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of
this case." Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963). In a footnote
the Florida court referred to "the problem of individual reactions to ordinarily harmless
substances, discussion of which we deem unwarranted here because of the lack of Florida
precedent and the limited issue posed in this nonadversary proceeding." Id. at 170 n.2.
94. In the light of McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965), and Russell
v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966).
95. "The defendant argues, however, that even under that [Florida] definition, it was
entitled to a directed verdict because there was no evidence that Lucky Strike cigarettes
were not 'reasonably fit and wholesome.' To products intended for human consumption
and the use of which may cause injury or death, the jury may properly apply a very strict
standard of reasonableness." Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir.
1963).
96. Reported in C.C.H. PRODS. LIAB. REP. 5341 (S.D. Fla. 1964). On the whole
problem, see Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678
(1966).
97. Edison v. Lewis Mfg. Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 429, 336 P,2d 286 (1959) (ring for
safety belt). Accord, Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576, motion
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It has been applied to dealers, whether at retail99 or at wholesale,1°°
although it is obvious that due care will not require as much of the
dealer as of the manufacturer. 1 1 The liability has gone beyond sellers,
and has been applied to one who merely does repair work on the
chattel, 102 or turns it over under a contract to have work done on it,103
and even to the builder of a building who sells it.1°4 A bailor for hire,
or otherwise for his own benefit, is held to the full duty of reasonable
care, including inspection to discover unknown defects.105 This
state, 1 6 however, appears to agree with numerous others, that a
gratuitous lender or donor is not required to inspect, 10 7 and is liable
denied, 259 N.Y. 664, 182 N.E. 225 (1932); Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820 (10 Cir. 1944);
State ex rel. Woodzell v. Garzell Plastics Indus., 152 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1957)
(Maryland law); Fredericks v. American Export Lines, 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955); Willey
v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 406,251 S.W.2d 635 (1952); Carson v. Weston Hotel Corp., 342 Ill.
App. 602,97 N.E.2d 620 (1951).
98. Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942). Accord, Rauch v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 252 Iowa 1, 104 N.W.2d 607 (1960); Alexander v.
Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958); Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820 (10th
Cir. 1944); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
99. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951); Baker v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
100. Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311
(1961).
101. Thus the dealer is under no duty to inspect or test a product sold in a sealed
container, or apparently safe. Gobin v. Avenue Food Mart, 178 Cal. App. 2d 345, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 822 (1960); Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co., 108 Cal. App. 22, 290 Pac. 919 (1930); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941). He is, however, required to
make a reasonable inspection of such a product as an automobile. Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal.
2d 399,240 P.2d 575 (1952).
102. Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932). Cf. Cowles v.
Independent Elevator Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 109, 70 P.2d 711 (1937) (inspecting elevator);
Supera v. Moreland Sales Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 186, 56 P.2d 595 (1936) (reconditioning
and selling truck).
103. Sloboden v. Time Oil Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 557, 281 P.2d 85 (1955). Cf. McCall v.
Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 123 Cal. 42, 55 Pac. 706 (1898) (shipowner furnishing sling to
contractor for use on ship).
104. Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228,201 P.2d 1 (1948). Cf. Hall v. Barber Door Co., 218
Cal. 412, 23 P.2d 279 (1933) (contractor installing doors); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21,
27 Cal. Rptr. 689,377 P.2d 889 (1963) (contractor working on building); Stewart v. Cox, 55
Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521,362 P.2d 345 (1961) (same as to swimming pool).
105. Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 345 P.2d 341 (1959); Varas v. Barco Mfg.
Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962); Zucker v. Passetti Trucking Co., 191
Cal. App. 2d 260, 12 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1961); Rohar v. Osborne, 133 Cal. App. 2d 345, 284
P.2d 125 (1955); McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740,255 P.2d 810 (1953).
106. See Rocha v. Garcia, 203 Cal. 167, 263 Pac. 238 (1928); The Pegeen, 14 F. Supp.
748 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835, 345 P.2d 341 (1959); Kite v.
Coastal Oil Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 336,328 P.2d 45 (1958).
107. Gagnon v. Dana, 69 N.H. 264,39 Atl. 982 (1897); Johnson v. H. M. Bullard Co., 95
Conn. 251, 111 Atl. 70 (1920); Davis v. Sanderman, 225 Iowa 1001, 228 N.W. 717 (1938);
Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1941); Nelson v. Fruehauf
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only for a failure to disclose dangers of which he is aware.108
So far as strict liability is concerned, no case has been found in
any jurisdiction which has imposed it upon anyone who was not
engaged in the business of supplying goods of the particular kind. The
Restatement of Torts'0 9 has so limited the liability. When a housewife,
on one occasion, sells a jar of jam to her neighbor, or the owner of an
automobile trades it in to a dealer, the undertaking to the public and
the justified reliance upon that undertaking on the part of the
ultimate purchaser are conspicuously lacking.
Elsewhere warranty to the consumer has been imposed upon the
maker of a component part, unchanged when assembled," 0 and upon
an assembler of parts;"' and it may certainly be anticipated that
California will agree. In this state the warranty has been applied to
dealers, whether at retail" 2 or at wholesale," 3 and the reluctance to
burden such sellers which has troubled a very few other courts'1 4 has
not been manifested. The strict liability in tort of the Greeman case" 5
has been applied to a direct sale from the dealer to the plaintiff," 6 and
Trailer Co., 20 N.J. Super. 198,89 A.2d 445 (1952), afftd, 11 N.J. 413,94 A.2d 655 (1953).
108. See cases cited note 107 supra. Also Russell Constr. Co. v. Ponder, 143 Tex 412,
186 S.W.2d 233 (1945); Logan v. Hope, 139 Ga. 589, 77 S.E. 809 (1913); Sturtevant v.
Pagel, 134 Tex. 46, 130 S.W.2d 1017 (1939); Clancy v. R. O'Brien & Co., 345 Mass. 772,
187 N.E.2d 865 (1963).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, and comment f (1965).
110. McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Putnam v. Erie City Mfg.
Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d
182 (1965); Taylerson v. American Airlines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The
last named case is no doubt supplanted by Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), in which the maker of an altimeter
was relieved from liability on the unusual ground that the plaintiff has sufficient remedy
against the maker of the plane. Accord, Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231
F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). And in Halpem v. Jad Constr. Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 875,
244 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1963), this was applied to a tire on a tractor.
111. Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Ford Motor Co. v.
Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla.
App. 1963). In Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 270 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct.
1966), one who initiated the manufacture of nails and supplied specifications and a
container marked with his trade name was held liable on an implied warranty.
112. Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); cf.
Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., 4 Cal. 2d 206,47 P.2d 708 (1935).
113. Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); Jones v.
Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961); Canifax v.
Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44,46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
114. See, for example, Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961); Elmore
v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189 Miss. 370, 197 So. 761 (1940); De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee
Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447,100 S.W.2d 336 (1936).
115. 59 Cal. 2d 57,27 Cal. Rptr. 697,377 P.2d 897 (1963).
116. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964).
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so, as to physical harm," 7 has superseded the direct warranty. There
are no California cases as yet as to non-sellers. In New Jersey the
strict liability without privity has been imposed upon a lessor,"8 and
upon a defendant who constructed a building and sold it.119 It appears
quite probable that these decisions will be accepted in California. The
repairman has not yet put in an appearance anywhere, and there can
only be speculation as to whether the line is to be drawn at one who
has transferred some interest in the thing itself in the course of his
business.
What Plaintiffs?
The negligence liability clearly extends to any lawful 20 user of
the thing supplied;121 and on the basis of the unreasonable risk
created it has been extended to all those who, as the Restatement'
22
now puts it, should be "expected to be endangered by its probable
use," including a mere bystander, or a pedestrian in the path of a
car.123 In short, to any foreseeable plaintiff.
The strict liability also applies in favor of any lawful user or
consumer, in the broadest sense of the term, including the employees
117. But apparently not as to pecuniary loss. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d
9,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965).
118. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 NJ. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
In Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'r Co., 243 A.C.A. 1002, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966),
it was assumed, without deciding, that this case would be followed.
119. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,207 A.2d 314 (1965).
120. There has been no decision anywhere as yet as to an unlawful user, such as a thief
or a trespasser. It appears unlikely that the liability would be found.
121. Employees: Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514
(1964); Edison v. Lewis Mfg, Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 429, 336 P.2d 286 (1959); Di Muro v.
Masterson Trusafe Steel Scaffold Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 784, 14 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1961)
(violation of statute); McClelland v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698,207 P.2d 591
(1949); Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (1958);
Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1951); The S.S. Samovar, 72 F.
Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App, 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr.
737 (1962); Sloboden v. Time Oil Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 557,281 P.2d 85 (1955); Kalash v.
Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934).
Customer sitting in chair: Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942).
Invitee of bailee: Tierstein v. Licht, 174 Cal. App. 2d 835,345 P.2d 341 (1959).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 395 (1965).
123. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951) (bystander);
Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952) (passenger in other car). Accord,
Gaidry Motors v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196
Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959);
Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954); Greyhound Corp. v.
Brown, 269 Ala. 520, 113 So. 2d 916 (1959); McLeod v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 318 Mo. 397,
1 S.W.2d 122 (1927).
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of the ultimate purchaser, 24 the members of his family,'2 his
guests, 126 and his donee.127 A passenger in an airplane'2 or an
automobile' 29 has been held to be such a user; and so have a customer
in a beauty shop to whose hair a dye was applied,130 a child injected
with poliomyelitis vaccine,13' a shopper about to buy in a self-service
market, 132 a wife cooking rabbits for her husband's dinner with no
intention of eating them herself, 33 and even a filling station mechanic
doing work on a car.
134
124. Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987,41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964); Vallis v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 770, 14 Cal, Rptr. 602 (1961); Jones v.
Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961); Crane v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855,32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
125. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173
N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164
S.W.2d 828 (1942).
126. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Tomczuk v. Town of
Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965); Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 70 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 1954); Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312 169 N.Y.S.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Dipanegrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. 2d 720,393 P.2d 936 (1964).
127. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939). Cf. Simpson v.
Powered Products, Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409,192 A.2d 555 (1963) (lessee).
128. Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (California
law); Public Adm'r v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Siegel v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Middlleton v. United Aircraft
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., 204 F. Supp.
865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962);
King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. App. 1963); Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,191 N.E.2d 81,240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
129. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Hacker v. Rector, 250 F.
Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Haley v. Merritt Chevrolet Co., C.C.H. PRODS. LIAB. REP. 1
5512 (Ill. App. 1966). Cf. McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965) (ship
passenger).
130. Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 290, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Graham v.
Bottenfleld's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68,269 P.2d 413 (1954).
131. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960). Cf.
Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) (surgical pin for setting bone
fractures).
132. Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963);
Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1966). Cf. Delaney v. Townmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4
(2d Cir. 1964); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (prospective purchasers
trying out product).
133. Haut v. Kleene, 320 Ill. App. 273,50 N.E.2d 855 (1943).
134. Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Sup. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963) (express warranty in
advertising).
In Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. App. 1966), it was alleged that
plaintiff came in contact with a glass door in a passageway. The court assumed, on the
basis of the Restatement, that he was required to be a "user or consumer," but held that
the allegation was sufficient to "shadow forth the semblance of a cause of action," since it
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This is clear enough. But bystanders and other non-users of the
product present a more difficult problem, which raises a fundamental
question as to the basis of the strict liability. If it rests upon a policy of
risk distribution, 135 which imposes upon the seller liability without
fault for any harm done by a defective product, because he is in the
better position to insure against it and to pass on the cost, then there
is no reason whatever to distinguish between the pedestrian hit by an
automobile and its driver-nor is there any good reason to distinguish
he man hit by the seller's delivery truck, or one injured on his
premises. If, on the other hand, the theory is one of an implied
representation of safety, made by placing the goods on the market,
and of reliance upon such assurance, or on the created appearance of
safety, then it is obvious that the pedestrian is not the man the seller
has sought to reach, that no assurance has been given to him, and that
he has relied upon nothing. All that he has done is to be there when
the accident occurs; and in this he does not differ from any other
plaintiff. Both justifications were stated in the Greenman case; and it
would appear that a choice must be made between them.
In other jurisdictions it is the second of these theories that has, in
general, been adopted; and the strict liability has thus far been
rejected as to the non-user by most of the decisions.136 Last year,
however, the Michigan court kicked over the traces, and found strict
liability when a shotgun exploded and injured a bystander. 37 This was
followed by one case in a lower court in Connecticut, 138 which is
was "susceptible of the inference that plaintiff was using such doors." Id. at 604.
135. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
136. Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (pedestrian hit by car); Torpey v.
Red Owl Stores, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (guest opening glass jar); Rodriguez v. Shell's
City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. App. 1962) (bystander); Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa
27, 126 N.W.2d 350 (1964) (driver of colliding car); Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc., 23
App. Div. 2d 530,256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965) (passengers in colliding car), Kasey v. Suburban
Gas Heat, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962) (cafe wrecked by explosion of
propane gas). See also, in a jurisdiction not recognizing strict liability without privity,
Alexander Funeral Home, Inc. v. Pride, 261 N.C. 723, 136 S.E.2d 120 (1964) (building run
into by car). In Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962), where
the plaintiff was hit by a wheel that came off of a truck, the question was left open and the
case decided on other grounds.
137. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
138. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142,214 A.2d 694 (1965). There is also Webb v.
Zem, 220 A.2d 853, 422 Pa. 215 (1966), where a bystander who was the brother of the
purchaser was allowed to recover without discussion of his status. He had shortly before
tapped the keg of beer which exploded, which may perhaps have made him a user; and in
view of the Pennsylvania reliance on the Uniform Commercial Code as to "members of
the household" in Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966), and Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), it is not at all clear that any other
bystander would recover.
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contradicted by another such court.139 More recently, the Fifth
Circuit, which purported to apply Florida law, joined Michigan when
a cabin cruiser blew up and set fire to other boats moored in the
vicinity.140 It may still be too early to say whether these decisions
represent a new breakthrough to the ultimate triumph of the "risk
distribution" theory, or whether they are ultimately to be regarded
only as isolated and sporadic departures. The only decision in
California, 141 where the plaintiff's road grader was hit by a defective
automobile, went off on the clearly erroneous ground, which has been
rejected by the supreme court,142 that there could be no strict liability
for damage to property. This is certainly the major problem among
the issues not yet determined in this state.
What Damages?
There can be no doubt that the negligence liability covers any
kind of physical harm, including damage to the defective chattel itself,
as where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own bad brakes, 143
as well as damage to any other property in the vicinity.
144
Personal injury has long dominated the strict liability cases, if
only because it is the obvious consequence of bad food. The
elimination of "warranty" in California has laid to rest any lingering
doubt' 45 there might have been as to whether there could be recovery
139. Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383,206 A.2d 275 (1964).
140. Trojan Boat Co. v. Lutz, 358 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1966).
141. Brewer v. Reliable Automotive Co., 240 A.C.A. 175,49 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1966). The
only other California case remotely bearing on the question is Gutierrez v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. App. 1966).
142. "Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranties governs the economic
relations between the parties, the doctrine of strict liability in tort should be extended to
govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as personal injury. We agree with this
contention. Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason
to distinguish them." Traynor, C.J., in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17,24,403 P.2d 145,152 (1965).
143. Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464, 227 P.2d 923 (1951);
Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Stewart v. Cox, 55
Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961) (swimming pool); Sabella v. Wisler, 59
Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963) (building). These cases overrule
Judson-Pacific-Murphy, Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 828, 275 P.2d 841
(1954).
144. Quirici v. Freeman, 98 Cal. App. 2d 194, 219 P.2d 897 (1950); Mack v. Hugh W.
Comstock Associates, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 2d 583, 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964); Basin Oil Co. v.
Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954) (direct sale); Kolberg v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 93 Cal. App. 609,269 Pac. 975 (1928).
145. Some courts formerly denied recovery, as in Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1944); S. H. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 331 (5th
Cir. 1919); Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951); Goodwin v. Misticos,
207 Miss. 361,42 So. 2d 397 (1949); Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.H. 365,189 Atl. 865 (1937).
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for wrongful death resulting from a breach of warranty.146 With the
extension of the rule to products other than food, physical harm to
property entered the picture; and recovery has generally been
allowed both for damage to the defective chattel itself,147 and for
harm to other property, as where a building is wrecked by the
explosion of a gasoline stove.14 A late dictum of the California
supreme court149 appears to make it quite clear that both lines of
cases will be followed.
Pecuniary loss, mere pocketbook damage, offers greater
difficulties. There is nothing inherent in the character of such loss to
prevent its compensation with or without negligence; and the very
first case' 50 in which the Washington court declared the strict liability
as to food allowed recovery for loss of goodwill when a restaurant
served bad meat to its customers. Strict liability has been found
without any reluctance when the defective product is made into
something else, so that there is an indirect kind of physical harm to
other property.151 The Illinois court' 52 has found it by way of
indemnity when the driver of a defective car incurred liability to
146. Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (California
law); Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Montgomery v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Siegel v. Braniff
Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Middlleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204
F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D.
Minn. 1962); Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); King
v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. App. 1963); cf. Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply
Corp., 374 Mich. 194,132 NW.2d 54 (1965).
147. Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. App. 1963); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Jarnot v.
Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
148. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Rasmus v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5
(S.D. Cal. 1954); Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959);
Burrus Feed Mills, Inc. v. Reeder, 391 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
149. See note 142 supra. This appears to overrule Brewer v. Reliable Automotive Co.,
240 A.C.A. 175,49 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1966).
150. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622,135 Pac. 633 (1913).
151. Hayman v. Shoemake, 203 Cal. App. 2d 140,21 Cal. Rptr, 519 (1962) (crop grown
from seed, express warranty); Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th
Cir. 1959) (batch of dough ruined by glass in ice); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d
514 (Fla. 1953) (crop grown from seed); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (cinder blocks used in a house); cf.
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (fabrics made into garments, express warranty).
152. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Il1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Compare, on
direct warranty, Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d 869, 280 P.2d 235 (1954); Basin Oil Co.
v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578,271 P.2d 122 (1954); Grupe v. Click, 26 Cal.
2d 680, 160 P.2d 832 (1945); Pezel v. Yerex, 56 Cal. App. 304,205 Pac. 475 (1922).
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others in a collision with a bus.
The troublesome question concerns the manufacturer's liability
for mere loss on the bargain-which is to say that the thing the
plaintiff has purchased has less value than it was supposed to have. 153
The difficulty is that the existence, and the extent, of any loss on the
bargain must depend upon what the bargain is; and the bargain is
made with the dealer from whom the plaintiff buys, and not with the
manufacturer. The loss turns not only on the value of the thing
received, but also upon the price paid and the dealer's undertaking. If
he overprices the goods, or sells Grade 2 as Grade 1, there will be a
loss on the bargain even if the product is not defective at all, and of
course all the more so if it is-but how much of that loss is to be
attributed to the manufacturer? What if the plaintiff trades in his old
automobile on a new one, and is given an inadequate allowance? If
the goods are sold "as is," there will be no loss on the bargain at all;
and if the dealer misrepresents their quality, or adds a warranty of his
own, such a loss may arise where it would not otherwise exist.' 54
These arguments might be persuasive to the effect that a mere
loss on the bargain, as distinguished perhaps from other and more
consequential pecuniary loss, is a matter to be determined in the first
instance between the plaintiff and the dealer; and that if the
manufacturer is to be liable, it should be to the dealer, and in an
amount which may be less, or conceivably even more, than the
dealer's own liability. They undoubtedly underlie the refusal, in all of
the decided cases,155 to allow recovery against the manufacturer for a
loss on the bargain resulting from his negligence. There are not many
cases dealing with strict liability, and "warranty," as might be
expected, has introduced a note of confusion. Outside of California,
four courts156 have found the strict liability, without much discussion,
153. See Note, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 715 (1965). A subsidiary question, of which no
discussion has been found anywhere, is whether the damages would be determined by the
tort, or "out-of-pocket" measure of the difference between the price paid and the value
received, or the contract, or "benefit-of-the-bargain" measure of the difference between
the value promised and the value received.
154. Some of this, at least, is said by Traynor, CJ., in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 17-18,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,23,403 P.2d 145, 151 (1965).
155. Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423,302 P.2d 665 (1956); Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct.
1955). Cf. Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass.
1956); Lucette Originals, Inc. v. General Cotton Converters, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 102, 185
N.Y.S.2d 854 (1959); Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1955); Polden Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Zell Elec. Mfg. Co., 1 Misc. 2d 1016, 156
N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957); A.J.P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply
Co., 171 Misc. 157, 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1939), affid mem. 258 App. Div. 747, 15
N.Y.S.2d 424 (1939), affd mem. 283 N.Y. 692,28 N.E.2d 412 (1940).
156. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Lang v.
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and four 57 have refused to find it.
The question arose in California in Seely v. White Motor Co.,'158
where a truck made by the defendant and purchased by the plaintiff
from a dealer proved to be defective and of inferior value. Chief
Justice Traynor found liability on an express warranty made to the
consumer, 159 but on the basis of some of the arguments outlined
above was unwilling to extend the strict liability in tort to the loss on
the bargain. Justice Peters alone voiced vigorous disagreement,
contending that the policy underlying the strict liability called for the
inclusion of pecuniary loss as well as physical harm, that there was no
basic difference in the nature of the damages, and that a "defective"
product should be regarded as the same thing as an
"unmerchantable" one. Although there are commentators who have
agreed with this,"'16 the issue appears to have been settled in
California as to loss on the bargain. It is, however, by no means clear,
notwithstanding the broad language of Chief Justice Traynor as to
"economic loss," that the question has been determined as to other
forms of pecuniary damage of a consequential character.
Abnormal Use
The negligence cases 161 have made it clear that the seller is
General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); see Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137
So. 2d 239 (Fla. App. 1962); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
157. Dennis v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Inglis
v. American Motors Corp., 197 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio App. 1964), affd on other grounds, 3
Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965); Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); cf. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 214
Tenn. 521,381 S.W.2d 884 (1964).
158. 63 Cal. 2d 9,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965).
159. See note 203 infra.
160. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966); Note, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 916 (1966).
161. Yecny v. Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 192, 26 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1962)
(misuse of vaporizer); Waterman v. Liederman, 16 Cal. App. 2d 483, 60 P.2d 881, hearing
denied per curiam, 62 P.2d 142 (1930) (wild driving on defective tire). Accord, Odekirk v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 274 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1960) (hammers struck together); McCready
v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959) (casements for window frames
used by workmen as ladders); Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.
1957) (hot catalyst used in cold catalyst refining unit); Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (negligent cropdusting); Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 94 F.
Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (cleaning fluid mixed with other chemical); Schfranek v.
Benjamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (wall decorating compound stirred
with hand); Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940)
(dangerous method of controlling powered agricultural machine); Moore v. Jefferson
Distilling & Denaturing Co., 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930) (match lighted to examine
oil drum); Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958) (wire binder for
wrapping steel used as handle to lift bundle of steel with crane); Zesch v. Abrasive Co.,
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entitled to expect a normal use of his product, and is not to be held
responsible for injuries resulting from an abnormal one. Since the
question is one of an unreasonably dangerous product, there is no
reason to doubt that the same conclusion will be carried over to the
strict liability. It has been held in California that there is no such
liability when a portable elevator is altered by the plaintiff's
employer,162 or when a drug sold to be administered under the
directions of a physician is used without them. 63 The warning and
instructions accompanying the product are important; and when a
hair dye is used without a patch test in disregard of such instructions,
there is no strict liability.164 There are similar cases in other
jurisdictions.
At the same time there are some relatively unusual uses of a
product, such as standing on a chair, 65 which the seller is required to
354 Mo. 1147, 193 S.W.2d 581 (1946) (grinding wheel subjected to side pressure); Dubbs v.
Zak Bros. Co., 38 Ohio App. 299, 175 N.E. 626 (1931) (wearing shoes that did not fit).
162. Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957); Martinez v. Nichols
Conveyor & Eng. Co., 243 A.C.A. 1002,52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966) (employer altering paper
baler). Cf. Solomon v. Red River Lumber Co., 56 Cal. App. 742, 206 Pac. 498 (1922)
(teacher modifying swing).
163. Magee v. Wyeth Labs., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963).
164. Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957). Cf. Cembrook v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 41 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1965) (aspirin taken in
excessive quantities over a period of twenty-two years; express representations). Accord,
Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658 (App. Div. 1961) (drug
sold and used without prescription); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946)
(wire rope subjected to excessive strain); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 207
A.2d 314 (1965) (heating unit installed without recommended valve); Gardner v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (opening bottle in wrong
manner); Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (sensitive cattle in
contact with insecticide); Strahiendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 823
(1962) (toy airplane shot by one child at another); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.
2d 113 (Miss. 1966) (water heater installed without following instructions); Power Ski, Inc.
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 188 So. 2d 13 (Fla. App. 1966) (substance for filling skis improperly
compounded against directions).
Accord, as to negligence: Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151
N.E.2d 263 (1958) (glass jar pried open with beer can opener); Taylor v. Jacobson, 336
Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958) (hair dye used without patch test); Wood Motor Car Co.
v. Tobin, 120 N.J.L. 587, 1 A.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (antifreeze used in violation of
directions); Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938) (dry
cleaning fluid used in enclosed space); Landers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 172 Ore. 116, 139
P.2d 788 (1943) (bleaching solution not diluted); Bender v. William Cooper & Nephews,
323 Ill. App. 96, 55 N.E.2d 94 (1944) (disinfectant not diluted); E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378,73 So. 2d 249 (1954) (soybean meal sold to processor who
disregarded warning and used it in preparing cattle feed).
165. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857
(1951). Cf. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952) (cocktail
robe worn in proximity to stove); Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962)
(dancing in hula skirt near a fire); McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1936)
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anticipate, and against which he is required at least to give warning;
and when such warning is not given, it has been held that the product
is unsafe, and in a real sense defective,166 and that there is strict
liability. It appears very probable, for example, that if a poisonous
cleaning fluid is supplied for household use, a failure to give warning
of its character, with instructions to keep it away from children, will
result in strict liability.
167
Intervening Negligence
In the negligence cases the rule has developed that the failure of
an intervening party, such as a dealer or an employer, to discover and
remedy the defect in the product, 68 or indeed any other foreseeable
negligence, 69 such as improper driving of an automobile with bad
brakes,170 will not relieve the seller of liability. Sometimes this has
been put as a matter of duty, sometimes as "proximate cause." At the
same time it has been held in several cases' 7 ' that when the
(cooking pork to inadequate extent believed to be sufficient); Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21,
200 N.E. 403 (1936) (same); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248
Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956) (tractor operated downhill at fast speed, using engine
compression as brake); Nathan v. Electriglas Corp., 37 N.J. Super. 494, 117 A.2d 620 (App.
Div. 1955) (testing heat-producing quality of electric fixture); Swaney v. Peden Steel Co.,
259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963) (manufacturer of steel truss knew of universal custom
for steel workers to ride the load).
166. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963);
Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44,46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
167. Cf. Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681
(1964).
168. Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961)
(subcontractor, swimming pool); Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48
(1951) (failure of dealer to label); Rae v. California Equip. Co., 12 Cal. 2d 563, 86 P.2d 352
(1939) (failure to have hoist inspected and licensed). Accord, Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Co., 261 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1958); Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951); Mull v. Colt Co., 31
F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929);
Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923); Gwyn v. Lucky City
Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123,113 S.E.2d 302 (1960).
169. Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (1958)
(negligent operation of crane); Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Rogers Pattern & Aluminum
Foundry, 73 Cal. App. 2d 442, 166 P.2d 401 (1946) (placing castings in molten salt bath);
Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (sudden swerve of driver to avoid
collision); Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956) (workman lighting
match); Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (D. Mich. 1918) (store customer
negligently discharged air rifle at plaintiff); Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053
(1958) (fellow servant dropped bottle of nail polish remover).
170. Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575. See generally, as to foreseeable
intervening causes, Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213,157 P.2d 372 (1945).
171. Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 Pac. 29 (1916) (gasoline sold for
kerosene); Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688,59 P.2d 100 (1936) (employer using
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intermediate handier in fact discovers the danger, and nevertheless
deliberately passes on the product without a warning, the
responsibility is usually shifted to him, and the seller's liability is
superseded. This in turn must be qualified by the holdings in a few
other cases,172 that there are some products so highly dangerous, and
so utterly unsuited for their intended use, that even such discovery of
the danger and deliberate failure to disclose will not relieve the seller.
There is every reason to expect that the same conclusions, in
general, will be reached when strict liability is in question. 7 3 At this
point, however, there enters the most extreme of all the decisions thus
far handed down on strict liability, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,74
in California in 1964. The case held that the obligation of the
manufacturer of an automobile to the ultimate user was such that it
could not delegate to its dealer responsibility for the final inspections,
corrections and adjustments necessary to make the car ready for use,
and that it could not escape the strict liability on the ground that the
defect in the delivered car was caused by something that the dealer
"did or failed to do."' 75
defective plank for scaffold); Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047
(1911); see Kapp v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 57 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1944). Cf.
Laughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407
(1962); Drazen v. Otis Elevator Co., 189 A.2d 693 (R.I. 1963); Nishida v. E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957); Trust Co. v. Lewis Auto Sales, 306 III. App.
132, 28 N.E.2d 300 (1940); Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840
(1946); Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341,246 Pac. 945 (1926).
172. Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 282 P.2d 12 (1955) (high
power cartridges used for shooting gallery); Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 271 Mass.
230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930) (inflammable combs for beauty shop); Clement v. Crosby & Co.,
148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745 (1907) (inflammable stove Polish); Kentucky Independent oil
Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925) (explosive mixture of gasoline and
kerosene).
173. Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (failure of dealer
to discover defect does not relieve manufacturer); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc.,
63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (1960) (same); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (same); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201
N.E.2d 313 (1964), affirmed, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (negligent failure to
discover bad brakes does not relieve manufacturer). As to intervening discovery of the
danger, see Halpern v. Jad Constr. Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 675, 202 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
174. 61 Cal. 2d 256,37 Cal. Rptr. 896,391 P.2d 168 (1964).
175. "It appears in the present case that Ford delegates the final steps in that process to
its authorized dealers. It does not deliver cars to its dealers that are ready to be driven
away by the ultimate purchasers but relies on its dealers to make the final inspections,
corrections, and adjustments necessary to make the cars ready for use. Since Ford, as the
manufacturer of the completed product, cannot delegate its duty to have its cars delivered
to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous defects, it cannot escape liability on the
ground that the defect in Vandermark's car may have been caused by something one of its
authorized dealers did or failed to do." Id. at 261, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899, 391 P.2d at 171
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The implications of the decision are as yet a bit uncertain. Any
idea that it might be concerned only with the somewhat peculiar
relation between automobile manufacturers and their dealers
disappears in the light of a subsequent decision of a District Court of
Appeal, 176 which applied the same rule to a concrete cutting machine
in a case where no vestige of an agency relation could be found.
Probably the decisions bear only upon the final "servicing" of
products, 177 and do not apply, for example, to further processing by
another manufacturer,178 or to the comer grocer who discovers that a
can of meat is leaking and deliberately sells it. But as to such
servicing, the rule apparently laid down is that the maker is to be held
to the strict liability even where the dealer discovers the danger and
fails to correct it, and perhaps even where it is his active negligence
that creates it in the first instance.
Express Representations
The strict liability without privity may be enlarged by express
representations made by the seller to the consumer. This idea
originated in 1932 with the Washington case of Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co., where literature distributed by the maker of an automobile
"'stated that the glass in its cars was "shatter-proof," and the plaintiff
was injured when a stone struck his windshield and shattered it. In its
first opinion 79 the court called the strict liability an express
"warranty," but on a second appeal it shifted its ground to one of
innocent misrepresentation,"' 8 0 which is a form of "fraud" recognized
by a considerable number of courts in the direct sale of any kind of
property.181 The case has been followed in a good many other
jurisdictions,182 and apparently is no longer questioned anywhere. 8 3
(1964).
176. Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987,41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964).
177. As to what this may include, see Milling, Henningsen and the Pre-Delivery
Inspection and Conditioning Schedule, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 559 (1962).
178. Cf. Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958). See text supra at
notes 74-77.
179. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), affd on rehearing,
168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
180. "Since it was the duty of appellant to know that the representation made to
purchasers were true: otherwise, it should not have made them. If a person states as true
material facts susceptible of knowledge to one who relies and acts thereon to his injury, if
the representations are false, it is immaterial that he did not know they were false, or that
be believed them to be true.... The court charged the jury that 'there is no proof of fraud
in this case.' It has become almost axiomatic that false representations including a sale or
contract constitute fraud in law." Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 128, 35 P.2d
1090, 1092 (1934).
181. See PROSSER, TORTS § 102, at 724-28 (3d ed. 1964).
182. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (watermelon seed);
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Most of the other courts have gone upon the basis of express
warranty; but very lately the Tennessee court, unwilling to overrule a
decision' 84 that had refused to find a "warranty" as to loss on the
bargain, reverted to the ground of misrepresentation. 8 5 This seems
clearly to be the preferable basis, since "warranty" without a contract
has been no more of a blessing in cases of express language than
where it is implied.
There are several California decisions, in which the strict liability
has been found as to statements made in advertising, 186 labels,187 or
disseminated literature, 88 and of course in a document supplied to a
dealer to be passed on to the consumer. 8 9 All of them have talked
express warranty; and even the Greenman'90 and Seely' 9' cases, which
Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952)
(washing powder); Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940)
(insecticide); Wise v. Hayes, 58 Wash. 2d 106, 361 P.2d 171 (1961) (same); Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (cigarettes); Arfons v. E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958) (dynamite); Hamon v. Digliani, 148
Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) (detergent); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188
A.2d 884 (1963) (automobile); Spiegel v. Saks 34th Street, 43 Misc. 2d 1065, 252 N.Y.S.2d
852 (1964) (cosmetic); Inglis v, American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132,209 N.E.2d 583
(1965) (automobile); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958) (permanent wave solution); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio
App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958) (same); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d
254 (6th Cir. 1960) (tire); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683,288 N.W. 309
(1939) (automobile.); Brown v. Globe Labs., Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957)
(sheep vaccine); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181
N.E.2d 399,226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (fabrics); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d
Cir. 1946) (wire rope); Ein v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 173 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ind.
1959) (tire).
183. Two early decisions rejecting the Baxter case, Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass
Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938), and Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.
1937), are now out of line with state law.
184. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.W.2d 884 (1964).
185. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966). Accord, Cooper v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
186. Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956)
(mattress); Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723 (1955)
("boned chicken"). Cf. Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal. 2d
713,128 P.2d 522 (1942) (fraud).
187. Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., supra note 186; Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons,
130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723, supra note 186; Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197
P.2d 854 (1948) (soap).
188. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963) (combination power tool).
189. Rose v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal. App. 2d 755, 28 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1963);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965)
(automobiles).
190. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963).
191. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965).
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discarded the implied warranty in favor of strict liability in tort,
continued to put the liability for express language on a warranty basis.
The limitations upon the rule seem to be fairly clear. The
statement must be one of fact, and more than mere sales talk or
"puffing," 192 although such general assertions as that a detergent is
"kind to the hands"'9 3 or that a product is "Number 1" and "first
class" 194 have been found to carry implications of fact. It must be
brought home to the defendant; and a dealer, merely by passing on
the manufacturer's literature, does not necessarily adopt it as his
own.195 It must be directed to the public, or at least intended to reach
a class of persons which includes the plaintiff,196 and a representation
made to one person with no reason to expect that he will pass it on to
another is not enough.197 The plaintiff must have relied on the
192. Alexander v. Stone, 29 Cal. App. 488, 156 Pac. 998 (1916) ("first class"); W. J.
Bush Co. v. Van Camp Sea Food Co., 55 Cal. App. 672, 203 Pac. 1026 (1921) (peach
kernel oil compared to olive oil); Blumer v. Rauer, 69 Cal. App. 195, 230 Pac. 964 (1924)
(manure mixtures would double crop of grapes); Steen v. Southern Cal. Supply Co., 74
Cal. App. 265, 239 Pac. 1098 (1925) (comparison with other products). Accord, Lambert
v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952); Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan.
428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950); Brown v. Globe Labs., Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957);
Ralston Purina Mills v. Iiams, 143 Neb. 588, 10 N.W.2d 452 (1943); Maupin v. Nutrena
Mills, 385 P.2d 504 (Okla. 1963).
193. Proctor [sic] & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d 157,268 P.2d
199 (1954). Cf. Morris v. Fiat Motor Sales Co., 32 Cal. App. 315, 162 Pac. 663 (1916) (year
model of car). Accord, Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253
S.W.2d 532 (1952); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961);
Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Arfons v. E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710,
174 A.2d 294 (1961); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct.
1963); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
194. Pacific Feed Co. v. Kennel, 63 Cal. App. 108, 218 Pac. 274 (1923). In Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), the
statement that a power tool was "rugged" was held to be sufficient.
195. Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348,161 P.2d 305 (1945).
196. In Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P.2d 45 (1956), a statement made to
agencies which directed the purchaser to buy was held to be sufficient. And in
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492, 32 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1963), a warranty to a building contractor was held to inure to the owner of the building.
In Hayman v. Shoemake, 203 Cal. App. 2d 140, 21 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1962), and Southern
California Enterprises v. D. N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d 785
(1947), a warranty to a plaintiff who bought from another was held to be effective.
197. Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955);
Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Supp. 479, 117 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. 1954); Barni v.
Kutner, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 550,76 A.2d 801 (1950); Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155,
103 S.W. 245 (1907); Pearl v. William Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529, 58 N.E.2d 825
(1945); Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); Silverman
v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953); Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell Co.,
122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922); Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Colo. 1954). See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Parties, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231
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assertion, not necessarily in making his purchase, 98 but at least in
making use of the product; 9 9 and in the absence of such reliance the
representation cannot be found to be a cause of his injury.2° Since the
basis of the recovery is not that the defendant has sold the product,
but that he has voluntarily assumed responsibility for his assertion
about it, and he may obviously undertake responsibility for more than
the safety of the product, the cases in other jurisdictions 1 have held
rather consistently2m that it extends to pecuniary loss, including loss
on the bargain; and with this the Seely case2 °3 in California has agreed.
Notice to the Seller
The requirement of the Uniform Sales Act,204 retained in a
modified form by the Uniform Commercial Code2 5 that the buyer
must give notice to the seller of any breach of warranty within a
reasonable time after he knows or ought to know of it, has clearly
been intended to protect the seller against unduly delayed claims for
damages.2°6 As applied to commercial transactions, it has been a
sound rule, and buyers usually have been quite competent to protect
themselves, and have given prompt notice as a matter of course.
(1966).
198. Cf. Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963), and
Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946), where the plaintiff was not a
purchaser at all.
199. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965).
200. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Sears Roebuck & Co.
v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941); Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10,
54 N.W.2d 769 (1952). See also Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo.
1954); Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946).
201. Posey v. Ford Motor Co., 128 So. 2d 149 (Fla. App. 1961); Beck v. Spindler, 256
Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209
N.E.2d 583 (1965). Cf. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) (inferior
crop grown from seed); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 399,226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (garments made from fabrics shrank).
202. Recovery has been denied only in Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 385,
347 P.2d 1056 (1960) (excessive consumption of gasoline and oil by automobile). In Holz
v. Coates Motor Co., 147 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1966), the plaintiff failed only for lack of
proof of the damages.
203. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965).
204. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 49, supra, note 50. See Note, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 586
(1963). This has frequently been applied to cases of direct sales. Davidson v. Herring-
Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 874, 280 P.2d 549 (1955); Vogel v. Thrifty Drug
Co., 43 Cal. 2d 184, 272 P.2d 1 (1954); Silvers v. Broadway Dep't Stores, 35 F. Supp. 625
(S.D. Cal. 1940); Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d 869, 280 P.2d 235 (1954) (notice
given); McAnulty v. Lema, 200 Cal. App. 2d 126, 19 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1962) (notice given).
205. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607 (3).
206. Learned Hand, J., in American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925).
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Where there is personal injury, and there is a remote seller, it has
proved to be something of a booby-trap for the unwary. The injured
consumer is seldom "steeped" in the business practice which justifies
the rule,"20 7 and at least until he has had legal advice it will not occur
to him to give notice to one with whom he has had no dealings.208
When "warranty" was extended beyond direct sales, it was at
first assumed that the notice requirement, along with the rest of the
Sales Act, must apply. It was treated as effective in California,
although there were only two decisions209 in which it prevented
recovery. There was a marked attempt, however, to protect the
injured consumer by holding that under the circumstances long
delayed notice could be found to be timely;210 and in one federal case
purporting to apply California law it was held that notice given even
after suit was brought could be found to be within a reasonable
time.211 As early as 1923, however, an attack began in New York upon
the notice requirement itself, with decisions holding that it was not
intended to apply to personal injuries, and that it was against public
policy so to apply it.212 In 1957 the Washington court, which has been
in the vanguard of all this more than once, met the issue head-on by
holding that the Sales Act did not require that notice be given to one
with whom the plaintiff2 13 has had no dealings. With this several other
courts have now agreed.2
14
207. James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 44, 192,197 (1955).
208. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1963).
209. In Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957), and Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Affiliated Gas Equip., Inc., 191 Cal. App. 2d 318, 12 Cal. Rptr. 729 ( 1961 ), it
was held that the notice must be pleaded. In Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198
Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961); Faucette v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d
196, 33 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1963); and Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275,
302 P.2d 331 (1956), it was assumed that notice was required, but timely notice was found
to have been given.
210. Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948); and see the last three cases in
the preceding note. Accord, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961); Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods.
Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955).
211. Hampton v. Gebhardt's Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1961). This
ignored the contrary holding in Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130
(1957).
212. Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1923);
Silverstein v. R. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943). Cf.
Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307,133 N.E.2d 713 (1956).
213. LaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645,314 P.2d 421 (1957).
214. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (Vermont law); Bennett v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Ill. 1964); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F.
Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd on other grounds, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1962); Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 416, 184
A.2d 63 (C.P. 1962); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
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In the Greenman case 15 the issue was finally determined in
Californa. Justice Traynor threw the requirement of notice out of the
window, both as to express warranties in the defendant's brochure
and as to strict liability in tort, saying that it was "not an appropriate
one for the court to adopt in actions by injured consumers against
manufacturers with whom they have not dealt. '216 A District Court of
Appeal has applied this to a claim for pecuniary loss against a remote
party on an express warranty.217 In the Vandermark case2 18 the
supreme court went even further, and held that there need not be
notice of personal injury to the retail dealer from whom the plaintiff
bad bought his automobile, because the basis of the liability was not
warranty, but strict liability in tort. The question remains open as to
notice to the immediate seller of a claim for pecuniary loss, which
remains in this state a matter of express warranty, and does not
involve strict liability in tort.219 If the courts of this state are to do
away with the notice requirement of the Commercial Code, they may
be hard put to find an explanation as to why it does not apply to the
warranty,220 and some rather remarkable gymnastics may be called
for. It would, however, be a venturesome matter to hazard any
prediction that this will not occur.
Disclaimers
The Uniform Sales Act221 provided that any warranty, express or
implied, could be disclaimed by the seller at the time of the sale; and
this has been retained in a somewhat modified form in the Uniform
(1965); Dispangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. 2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964); Santor v. A &
M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,207 A.2d 305 (1965).
215. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963).
216. 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
217. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 217 Cal. App. 2d 492, 32 Cal. Rptr.
144 (1963).
218. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964).
219. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965).
220. The only possibility which occurs to the writer would be to hold, in accord with
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), that the express "warranty" is in
reality a matter of strict liability for innocent misrepresentation.
221. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71. The purpose of the provision is discussed in Franck v.
J. J. Sugarman-Rudolph Co., 40 Cal. 2d 81, 251 P.2d 949 (1952). It has frequently been
given effect in direct sales resulting in pecuniary loss. Sutter v. Associated Seed Growers,
31 Cal. App. 2d 543, 88 P.2d 144 (1939); William A. Davis Co. v. Bertrand Seed Co., 94
Cal. App. 281, 271 Pac. 123 (1928); Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal. App. 156, 259 Pac.
108 (1927); Intrastate Credit Service, Inc. v. Pervo Paint Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 547, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (1965); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47
Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965); Donnelly v. Governair Corp., 145 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
STRICT LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER
Commercial Code.222 Commercially a disclaimer may not be at all an
unreasonable thing, particularly where the seller does not know the
quality of what he is selling, and the buyer is willing to take his
chances. "As is" sales are common and reasonable enough. Even so a
rather dangerous power of abuse is placed in the hands of the seller,
which the courts have done what they could to obviate, either by
construing away the disclaimer,223 or by finding that it was not
brought home to the buyer,224 or in an extreme case by refusing to
enforce it as a matter of "natural justice and good morals. '"225
It is another matter to say that a consumer who buys at retail is
to be bound by a disclaimer which be has never seen, and to which he
could certainly not have agreed if he had known of it, but which
defeats a duty imposed by the policy of the law for his protection.
And when the disclaimer is handed to him with the product, all reality
of consent to accede to it is lacking. Obviously if the opportunity is to
remain open to the seller to frustrate that policy completely by adding
such words as "Not Warranted in Any Way" to the label on the
package, it may be anticipated that there will be those who take
advantage of it.
It was to be expected that this would not be tolerated. In the
leading Henningsen case226 the New Jersey court invalidated the
standard automobile "warranty," in itself a disclaimer of almost all
222. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
223. Lindberg v. Coutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828,334 P.2d 701 (1959) ("as is" ineffective
as to mechanical defects under particular contract); Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co.,
125 Cal. App. 2d 578,271 P.2d 122 (1954) (does not exclude liability for negligence); Burr
v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (does not exclude warranty
of merchantable quality); Ferguson v. Koch, 204 Cal. 342,268 Pac. 342 (1928) ("as is" does
not exclude liability for express representations); Inner Shoe Tire Co. v. Tondro, 83 Cal.
App. 689, 257 Pac. 211 (1927) (construed strictly against seller; not applicable to particular
sale); Mulder v. Casho, 61 Cal. 2d 633, 39 Cal. Rptr. 705, 394 P.2d 545 (1964) ("as is" does
not avoid statutory requirement); Guntert & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Thermoid Co., 216 Cal.
App. 2d 771, 31 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1963) (ineffective against subsequent express warranty); cf.
Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963) (realty; ineffective
against fraud).
224. Guntert & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Thermoid Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 771, 31 Cal. Rptr.
99 (1963) (fine print); India Paint & Lacquer Co. v. United Steel Prods. Corp., 123 Cal.
App. 2d 597, 267 P.2d 408 (1954) (made after contract completed).
225. Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1939). Cf. as to the policy involved Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California, 60 Cal. 2d 92,32 Cal. Rptr. 33,383 P.2d 441 (1963).
226. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, (1960). Actually
this was not the first such decision. In Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 624,
211 Pac. 748, 750 (1922), it had been held that "since a specific warranty as to personal
property cannot run with the thing itself, we see no reason why a disclaimer of warranty
should run with the thing." Cf. Sokoloski v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942).
In Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959), an automobile
manufacturer's disclaimer was rejected without discussion.
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liability of any consequence, as a contract of adhesion 27 not in reality
involving any bargaining or freedom of consent, as unfair to the
consumer, and as against the policy of the law in promoting human
safety. Other courts have since agreed. 228 The elimination of
"warranty," and the recognition of outright strict liability in tort229
provided a way around the statutes, and afforded an additional
justification for refusing to enforce the manufacturer's disclaimer. In
the Vandermark case230 the California court applied this even to a
claim for personal injury on a direct sale from a dealer to the plaintiff.
Again the question remains open as to pecuniary loss,23 which in this
state is still a matter of warranty, and not strict liability in tort. There
is language in the Seely case 32 which indicates that where physical
safety is not involved a sale "as is," for example of a used automobile,
will still be effective. On the basis of nothing more than an opinion
that it should be, and that no overriding policy should prevent a seller
from refusing to accept responsibility for the value of what he sells, it
might be predicted that this will be the conclusion.
Contributory Negligence
The language of the courts is in a state of flat contradiction as to
whether contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability for a
defective product. Nearly all of the decisions have involved warranty,
either upon a direct sale or without privity. It has been said many
times that contributory negligence is never a defense to an action for
227. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,
53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072, 1089 (1953).
228. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 101 (D. Hawaii 1961), affd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961); Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965); Lang
v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson,
47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960); McMillen Feeds, Inc. of Texas v. Harlow, 405
S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 347 (Ill.
App. 1966). Contra, Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 (Fla. App. 1962).
229. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963).
230. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr, 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964). See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 518 (1965).
231. See text accompanying notes 158-160 supra.
232. "It was only because the defendant in that case [Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)] marketed the rug as Grade #1 that the court was
justified in holding that the rug was defective. Had the manufacturer not so described the
rug, but sold it 'as is,' or sold it disclaiming any guarantee of quality, there would have
been no basis for recovery in that case. Only if someone had been injured because the rug
was unsafe for use would there have been any basis for strict liability in tort." Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,17-18,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,23,403 P.2d 145,151 (1965).
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breach of warranty. It has been said more often that it is always a
defense. The confusion, however, is a superficial one of words and
definition only, and is merely part of the general murk that has
surrounded "warranty." If the substance of the cases is looked to,
rather than their language, they fall into an entirely consistent
pattern.
If the plaintiffs negligence consists only in a failure to discover
the danger involved in the product,233 or to take precautions against
the possibility of its existence, as in the case of negligent driving on a
defective tire, 34 it is clearly no defense to the strict liability. Thus if
the plaintiff drinks a beverage without discovering that it is full of
broken glass, 2 5 his failure to exercise due care in doing so does not
relieve the defendant. On the other hand, the kind of negligence
which consists of proceeding voluntarily to encounter a known
unreasonable danger, and which overlaps the defense of assumption
of risk, will relieve the defendant on either ground.236 If the plaintiff
233. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965) (smoking
cigarettes in ignorance of danger of lung cancer); Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957) (failure to discover matches in beverage); Brown v.
Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961)
(dancing in hula skirt near a fire); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897
(1965) (failure to discover shot in ham); Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199
(1933) (poisoned flour; details not alleged, but quite unlikely that plaintiff discovered it);
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (failure to discover
defect in kingpin of truck); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 406 S.E.2d 483 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) (failure to test kerosene).
234. Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Hansen v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960). Accord, Bahlman v. Hudson
Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (express warranty of top of car,
negligent driving).
235. Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963).
236. Dallison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) (smoking in bed);
Hitchcock v. Hunt, 28 Conn. 343 (1859) (using barrels known to be leaking); Tomita v.
Johnson, 49 Idaho 643,290 Pac. 395 (1930) (planting seeds known to be the wrong kind);
Cedar Rapids & I.C. Ry. & Light Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 203 Ill. App. 424, affd, 280 Ill.
386, 117 N.E. 461 (1917) (use of electric shovel after discovery of defect); Frier v. Proctor
[sic] & Gamble Distrib. Co., 173 Kan. 733, 252 P.2d 850 (1953) (use of detergent with
knowledge it was injuring hands); Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428,
213 P.2d 964 (1950) (feeding chickens with knowledge feed was injuring them); Barefleld
v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1,120 N.W.2d 786 (1963) (drinking beverage
known to be full of broken glass); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127
N.W.2d 557 (1964) (opening bottle in wrong manner); Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445,
72 N.W.2d 861 (1955) (continued use of oil burner known not to be functioning properly);
Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) (use of bags
known to be defective); Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 679,147 S.W.2d
124 (1941) (refrigerated meat showcase used after discovery of unfitness); Maiorino v.
Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570,214 A.2d 18 (1965) (opening glass toothbrush container with
pressure); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) (driving truck knowing brakes to be bad); Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., 281 N.Y. 474,
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continues to operate a washing machine after discovery that the
wringer is dangerously defective, 237 or negligently drives on a tire that
he knows to be unsafe,238 he cannot recover. These rules are quite
consistent with those worked out as to other strict liability for animals
and for abnormally dangerous activities.
239
The few California cases support this distinction, denying the
recovery where the plaintiff was aware of the danger,240 and allowing
it where he was not.241 There is nothing in the outright strict liability
in tort to call for any change in the rules as to warranty.242 It is always
possible, however, that the plaintiff's negligence may amount to an
abnormal use of the product, and so relieves the defendant, not on
the basis of contributory negligence, but on that of proximate
cause.
243
24 N.E.2d 131 (1939) (improper cooking of pork by experienced cook); Bates v. Fish Bros.
Wagon Co., 50 App. Div. 38, 63 N.Y.S. 649 (1900) (use of heating apparatus after
discovery of the defect); Bruce v. Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co., 47 App. Div. 273, 62
N.Y.S. 96 (1900) (use of horse discovered to to be dangerous); Walker v. Hickory Packing
Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941) (eating biscuits with foul odor); Pauls Valley
Milling Co. v. Gabbert, 182 Okla. 500,78 P.2d 685 (1938) (planting seeds known to be the
wrong kind); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Nicholson, 17 Pa. Super. 188 (1901)
(use of rope after it had broken); Tex-Tube, Inc. v. Rockwall Corp., 379 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964) (failure to shut off pump after discovery of leak in pipe).
237. Gutelius v. General Elec. Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P.2d 682 (1940).
238. Youtz v. Thompson Tire Co., 46 Cal. App. 2d 672, 116 P.2d 636 (1941).
239. See PROSSER, TORTS § 78, at 539-40 (3d ed. 1964).
240. Gutelius v. General Elec. Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P.2d 636 (1941); Youtz v.
Thompson Tire Co., 46 Cal. App. 2d 672, 116 P.2d 682 (1940); Martinez v. Nichols
Conveyor & Eng. Co., 243 A.C.A. 1002,52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966) (use of paper baler with
knowledge of defect).
241. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855,32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963) (use
of surface preparer in ignorance of danger of combustion from distant flame); Vassallo v.
Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963) (handling milk bottle
without knowledge of defect); Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr.
276 (1962) (eating candy bar without discovering it was wormy).
242. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra note 241.
243. A good case on this is Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964),
where defendant withdrew the defense of contributory negligence because it could not
prove which decedent was flying the plane. It was held, nevertheless, that the plaintiff
must sustain his burden of showing that the crash was due to a defect in the plane rather
than to negligent flying. A similar case is Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Cal.
App. 1966). See also Dallison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1963)
(smoking in bed); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958)
(plaintiffs storage of high-moisture content corn in a bin held to be the proximate cause of
damage to the corn); Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11
(1938) (carbon tetrachloride used in enclosed space); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) (opening bottle in wrong manner).
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Proof
The proof of strict liability for a defective product does not
appear to differ in any significant respect from the proof of
negligence.244 In a negligence case the plaintiff has the initial burden
of establishing three things. The first is that he has been injured by
the product. This is no less true of strict liability. It is not enough to
show that the plaintiff ate the defendant's food and became ill, so
long as he ate other things, and others who ate the food were not
made ill 245 The second is that the injury occurred because the product
was defective; and this also is no less true of strict liability. Proof that
an airplane has crashed does not make out a case against the
manufacturer, where there is no evidence to show that it was not due
to negligent flying.246 The third is that the defect existed when the
product left the hands of the defendant; and this again is no less true
of strict liability. When meat has been exposed to the air for a
considerable time by a dealer, and might have spoiled in the process,
the burden of proof against the original supplier of the meat is not
sustained.247 The elimination of negligence as the basis of recovery
does not relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of making out his case as
to all of these three elements.
Once the plaintiff has proved all three, all trial lawyers know that
the plaintiff usually recovers against the manufacturer for negligence.
This is because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 248 ordinarily allows
244. Particularly helpful on this are Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the
Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. REV. 675 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-
Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
245. Geisness v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wash. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 740 (1942). Cf.
Landers v. Safeway Stores, 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943) (bleaching compound).
246. Hurley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 355 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1966); Swain v. Boeing
Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964). Cf. Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534,383
S.W.2d 885 (1964); Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557
(1964); Scientific Supply Co. v. Zelinger, 139 Colo. 568, 341 P.2d 897 (1959), Williams v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
247. Tiffin v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.W.2d 406 (1959); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834,155 So. 217 (1934).
248. See Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183 (1949). For
applications of the principle to products liability, see Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. De
Lape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1940) (explosive cigarette); Woodworkers Tool Works v.
Byrne, 191 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1951) (disintegration of panel hood on shaper); Vandagriff v.
J. C. Penney Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 579, 39 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1964) (escalator); Zentz v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436,247 P.2d 344 (1952) (exploding bottle); Gordon v.
Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949) (same); Hoffing v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371,197 P.2d 56 (1948); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (same); McClelland v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App.
2d 698, 207 P.2d 591 (1949) (same); Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77
P.2d 833 (1938) (glass in bread). The requirements for res ipsa loquitur in a products
liability case are stated in Reynolds v. Natural Gas Equip., Inc., 184 Cal. App. 2d 724, 7
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the case to go to the jury, and the jury is permitted to, and usually
does, infer that some negligence of the defendant was responsible for
the defect. There have been, it is true, occasional cases in which the
court has refused to permit the inference to be drawn,249 or the
defendant's proof of due care has been found to be so conclusive as to
call for a directed verdict a20 and even instances in which the jury has
found that there is no negligence32 1 Strict liability eliminates such
cases; but they represent such a minor fraction of the total number
that the alarm voiced by a good many manufacturers over the
prospect of a vast increase in liability appears to be quite unfounded.
The difficult problems are those of proof by circumstantial
evidence, particularly as to the last two elements. Strictly speaking,
and since proof of negligence is not in issue, res ipsa loquitur has no
application to strict liability; but the inferences which are the core of
the doctrine remain, and are no less applicable.~25 The plaintiff is not
required to exclude all other possibilities, and so prove his case
beyond a reasonable doubt. As on other issues in civil cases, it is
enough that he makes out a preponderance of probability. It is
enough that the court cannot say that reasonable men on the jury
could not find it more likely than not that the fact is true.
253
The mere fact of an accident, as where an automobile goes into
the ditch, does not make out a case that the product was defective;z2 4
Cal. Rptr. 879 (1960).
249. See, for example, Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957)
(collapse of elevator, defect not discoverable); Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46
Cal. 2d 190,293 P.2d 26 (1956) (cement, danger not preventable); H. J. Heinz Co. v. Duke,
196 Ark. 180, 116 S.W.2d 1039 (1938); Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 318, 45 N.E. 253
(1896); O'Brien v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 255 Mass. 553, 152 N.E. 57 (1926); Crocker v.
Baltimore Dairy Lunch Co., 214 Mass. 177, 100 N.E. 1078 (1913).
250. See, for example, Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929);
Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N.W. 310 (1931); Smith v. Salem
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97,25 A.2d 125 (1942).
251. See, for example, Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93 N.W.2d
467 (1959).
252. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961). In Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958), the
court said that res ipsa loquitur had no application to an action for breach of warranty. In
Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956), the court
applied it to a case of express warranty.
253. Vandagriff v. J. C. Penney Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 579, 39 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1964);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,150 P.2d 436 (1944).
254. Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962) (wheel
broke); Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 365 Mo. 625, 285 S.W.2d 585 (1955) (fact
that combine did not give satisfactory service does not prove a defect); Remsberg v.
Hackney Mfg. Co., 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792 (1917) (same as to plow).
As to negligence, compare McNamara v. American Motors Corp., 247 F.2d 445 (5th
Cir. 1957) (backing car shot forward); Smith v. General Motors Corp., 227 F.2d 210 (5th
Cir. 1955) (car leaving road, testimony as to possibility of defect); Jastrzembski v. General
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nor does the fact that it is found in a defective condition after the
event, when it appears equally likely that it was caused by the
accident itself.2s5 The addition of other facts, tending to show that the
defect existed before the accident, 56 may make out a case, and so
may expert testimony.257 So likewise may proof that other similar
products made by the defendant met with similar misfortunes, 2 8 or
Motors Corp., 100 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (car starting into motion); O'Hara v.
General Motors Corp., 35 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Mich. 1940) (car leaving road); Herrin's
Adm'x v. Jackson, 265 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1954) (door of car coming open); Glinski v.
Szylling, 358 Mich. 182, 99 N.W.2d 637 (1959) (prior vibration in steering wheel not
enough); Shramek v. General Motors Corp., 216 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. App. 1966) (blowout);
Williams v. U.S. Royal Tires, 101 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 1958) (same); Haas v. Buick Motor
Div., 20 111. App. 2d 448, 156 N.E.2d 263 (1959) (fire in car); Kramer v. R. M. Hollingshead
Corp., 5 N.J. 386, 75 A.2d 861 (1950) (motor exploded while plaintiff pouring in solvent);
Ayers v. Amatucci, 206 Okla. 366, 243 P.2d 716 (1952) (leakage of gasoline); Kimmey v.
General Motors Corp., 262 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (fire while plaintiff was
filling gasoline tank); Price v. Ashby's, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 54, 354 P.2d 1064 (1960) (car
leaving road); Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938) (leakage of
gasoline). Cf. Rexall Drug Co. v. Nehill, 276 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1960) (loss of hair after use
of home permanent wave solution).
255. Davis v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 196 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (tread
separated from tire after crash); Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.
1954) (steering wheel of tractor off of shaft); General Motors Corp. v. Wolverine Ins. Co.,
255 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1958) (wheel off of car); Hupp Motor Car Corp. v. Wadsworth, 113
F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1940) (tire deflated); Fisher v. Sheppard, 366 Pa. 347,77 A.2d 417 (1951)
(broken sleeve in differential); Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736 (1919) (tire
blown out). Cf. Hill v. Mathews Paint Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 714, 308 P.2d 865 (1957) (fire
might have been due to sparks).
256. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (new car
veered suddenly from road without fault of driver). Accord, Jones v. Burgermeister
Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961) ("pronounced abrasion or
scuff mark at the lower part of the bottle"); Le Blanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225,
191 N.E.2d 301 (1963) (car went into gear with shift lever in neutral); M. Dietz & Sons v.
Miller, 43 NJ. Super. 334, 128 A.2d 719 (1957) (brake failure after car driven only fifty
miles); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961) (localized smell of burning); Clark v. Zuzich Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d
304 (Mo. App. 1961) (car out of control before it left the road): Knapp v. Willys-Ardmore,
Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105 (1958) (broken tie rod; witness saw front wheel turn
sharply to the right).
257. Spolter v. Four-Wheel Brake Service Co., 99 Cal. App. 2d 690,222 P.2d 307 (1950)
(rear wheel came off of car eight days after defendant had replaced it); Kuzma v. United
States Rubber Co., 323 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963) (disintegration of grinding wheel);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (automobile
wrecked); Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. App. 1963) (brake failure);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc. 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449
(fire in automobile); Clark v. Zuzich Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. App. 1961) (car
out of control). Cf. Buffums' v. City of Long Beach, 111 Cal. App. 327,295 P.2d 540 (1931)
(water main broke); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(exploding bottle); Hoffing v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56
(1948) (same); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514,202 P.2d 522 (1949) (same).
258. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926); Boyd v.
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the elimination of other causes by satisfactory evidence.259 In
addition, there are some accidents, as where a beverage bottle
explodes260 or even breaks261 while it is being handled normally, as to
which there is human experience that they do not ordinarily occur
without a defect. As in the cases of res ipsa loquitur, the experience
will give rise to the inference, and it may be sufficient to sustain the
plaintiff's burden of proof.
Tracing the defect in the product into the hands of the defendant
confronts the plaintiff with greater difficulties. There is first of all the
question of lapse of time and long continued use. This in itself will
never prevent recovery where there is satisfactory proof of an original
defect;262 but when there is no such definite evidence, and it is only a
matter of inference from the fact that something broke or gave way,
the continued use usually prevents the inference that more probably
than not the product was defective when it was sold.263 The seller
certainly does not undertake to provide a product that will never wear
out.264 In common with a few other jurisdictions,265 California has
Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 S.C. 383, 126 S.E.2d 178 (1962); Cf. Ashkenazi v.
Nehi Bottling Co., 217 N.C. 552, 8 S.E.2d 818 (1940).
259. Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945); Patterson v.
George H. Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501,370 P.2d 116 (1962).
260. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952); Vallis v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Jones v.
Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1961); McClelland
v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698,207 P.2d 591 (1949).
261. Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963) (milk
bottle broke shortly after delivery under normal handling).
262. Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp.,
262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1958) (fifteen years); International Derrick & Equip. Co. v. Croix.
241 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1957) (seven years); Fredericks v. American Export Lines, 227 F.2d
450 (2d Cir. 1955) (2 1/2 years); Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934)
(seven years); Hartleib v. General Motors Corp., 10 F.R.D. 380 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (two or
three years); Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959)
(three years); Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26 N.J. Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699
(1953) (three years).
263. Jabukowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964);
Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962) (both as to strict
liability). Accord, as to negligence: United States Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463 (8th
Cir. 1963); Solomon v. White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Sterchi Bros.
Stores v. Castleberry, 28 Ala. App. 281, 182 So. 471 (1938); Kapp v. Sullivan Chevrolet
Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962); Gorman v. Murphy Diesel Co., 42 Del. (3 Terry)
149, 29 A.2d 145 (1942); Hofstedt v. International Harvester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 98
N.W.2d 808 (1959); Auld v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d 491
(1941), aff'd mem. 288 N.Y. 515, 41 N.E.2d 927 (1941); Ayers v. Amatucci, 206 Okla. 366,
243 P.2d 716 (1952); D'Allesandro v. Edgar Murray Supply Co., 185 So. 2d 34 (La. App.
1966).
264. Gomez v. E. W. Bliss Co., 27 Misc. 2d 649, 211 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
Jabukowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 263; Auld v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., supra note 263. Hence it is error to exclude the evidence of wear and tear. Jones v.
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drawn a distinction between moving and stationary parts, which are
not so likely to fail with wear, and has permitted the inference in the
case of the latter.
266
With continued use eliminated as an obstacle, the plaintiff must
further eliminate his own improper conduct as an equally probable
cause of his injury.267 When he has done this, and has accounted for
other possible causes, he has made out a sufficient case of strict
liability for tile, defect against the dealer who has last sold the
product. But the very presence of the latter in the picture means that
he too must be eliminated before the case is established against the
manufacturer. When on the evidence it appears equally probable that
the defect has developed in the hands of the dealer, the plaintiff has
not made out a case of strict liability, or even negligence, against any
prior party.268 This has meant, in a good many cases, that when a
beverage bottle breaks or explodes the case against the manufacturer
is not established until the intermediate handling has been accounted
for.269 There need not be conclusive proof, and only enough is
required to permit a finding of the greater probability.270 Since the
plaintiff nearly always finds it difficult to obtain evidence as to what
has happened to the bottle along the way, the courts have been quite
lenient in finding the evidence sufficient. He is not required to do the
impossible by accounting for every moment of the bottle's existence
since it left the bottling plant;271 and it is enough that he produces
Johnston Testers, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 2d 162, 281 P.2d 602 (1955).
265. Carney v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962) (stepladder); Beadles
v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951) (carbon particles deposited in
refrigerator); Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 296 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1956) (axle housing of truck).
266. Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959)
(inspection cover on deck plate of bulldozer broke after three years).
267. Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614,140 P.2d 369 (1943).
268. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (insecticide),
Tiffin v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 181 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959) (opened meat);
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934) (same); Sundet v. Olin
Mathieson Chem. Corp., 139 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. 1966) (cartridges, several handlers);
Huggins v. John Morrell & Co., 176 Ohio St. 171, 198 N.E.2d 448 (1964) (explosion of
pickled pig's feet, several intermediate handlers); Krupar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 160
Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954) (needle in cake of soap).
269. Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958); Miller v. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 109, 297 P.2d 1024 (1956); Cunningham v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 106, 198 P.2d 333 (1948); Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 2d
674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942); Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614,140 P.2d 369 (1943).
270. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Gordon v.
Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514,203 P.2d 522 (1949); Honea v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944).
271. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 101 Ga. App. 166, 112 S.E.2d 811,
affd, 216 Ga. 61,114 S.E.2d 517 (1960); Zarling v. La Salle Coca Cola Bottling Co., 2 Wis.
2d 596,87 N.W.2d 263 (1958).
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sufficient evidence of careful handling in general, and of the absence
of unusual incidents, to permit reasonable men to draw the
conclusion.272
If the product reaches the plaintiff in a sealed container, with the
defect on the inside, the inference against the manufacturer is much
more easily drawn, and may even be conclusive.2 73 The foreign object
in the bottled beverage is the typical case.274 Negligence on the part of
any intermediate handler is almost necessarily ruled out. There may
still be the possibility of intentional tampering; and there are
decisions which have held that the plaintiff must still disprove it,275
particularly where the bottle has been exposed to meddling by
irresponsible persons,2 76 or a charged beverage is found to be "flat"
when it is opened.277 But in the absence of any such special reason to
look for it, the considerable majority of the later cases have held that
intentional tampering is so unusual, and so unlikely, that the
probabilities are against it, and the plaintiff is not required to
eliminate the possibility.2 7
8
272. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949); McClelland v.
Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698, 207 P.2d 591 (1949); Hoffing v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Ryan v. Adam Scheidt Brewing Co., 197 F.2d 614 (3d Cir.
1952); Groves v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1949); Coca Cola Bottling
Works v. Crow, 200 Tenn. 161,291 S.W.2d 589 (1956).
The fact that the product has only been out of the defendant's hands for a short time
is important evidence against him. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal, 2d 436, 247
P.2d 344 (1952); Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814
(1963).
273. Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938) (glass baked
in bread).
274. Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 III. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953); Le
Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Miller v.
Louisianan Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 1954); Manzoni v. Detroit
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961); Tafoya v. Las Cruces
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43,278 P.2d 575 (1955); Keller v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
214 Ore. 654,330 P.2d 346 (1958).
275. Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, 258 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1953); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721 (1942); Jordan v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578,218 P.2d 660 (1950).
276. Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d. 164 (1951);
Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1955). Cf. Cunningham v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 106, 198 P.2d 333 (1948) (bottle exploded after
being exposed in a vending machine).
277. Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442
(1956).
278. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Miami Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 221 La. 191, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Keller v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 Ore.
654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958); see Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43,
278 P.2d 575 (1955); cf. Le Blanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225, 191 N.E.2d 301 (1963)
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STRICT LIABILITY TO THE CONSUMER
There have been sporadic attempts to aid the plaintiff in his
difficulty of proof in cases where multiple defendants were joined. As
to both negligence and warranty, the Kansas court279 has shifted the
burden of proof as to tracing the defect to the shoulders of the dealer
and the manufacturer; and Pennsylvania has done the same as to
negligence.280 The reasoning in these cases as to the meaning of
"exclusive control," where it is obviously not exclusive as to either
party, is not very convincing. They are quite evidently deliberate
decisions of policy, seeking to compensate the plaintiff first, and to
leave the defendants to fight out the question of responsibility among
themselves. The same is to be said of a federal case out of Texas,281
the burden was shifted to the maker of dynamite and the maker of the
cap attached to it, on the ground that they were cooperating to make
a combination product; and one from New York2m where the same
thing was done as to the maker of an altimeter and the manufacturer
of a plane in which it was installed.
So far as appears, this is not yet the law of California. Neither the
decision in Summers v. Tice283 where the burden of proof as to
causation was shifted to two defendants after both of them had been
proved to be. negligent in shooting in the direction of the plaintiff,
nor Ybarra v. Spangard,284 where the burden was placed upon the
multiple members of the medical profession engaged in a surgical
operation, on the ground of the special responsibility assumed toward
the unconscious plaintiff,285 is authority for anything more than the
proposition that there are negligence cases in which, for special
reasons of policy, two or more defendants may be required to
exonerate themselves. In the only products liability decision286 in
California, involving a manufacturer, a wholesaler and a retailer, the
court refused to apply the Ybarra case on the ground that the special
responsibility was lacking, and left the burden of proof upon the
plaintiff.
(automobile).
Particularly where the beverage foams or effervesces when it is opened. Heimsoth v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., I Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953); Rozumailski v.
Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl. 700 (1929); Wichita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Tyler, 288 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
279. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
280. Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212,93 A.2d 451 (1953).
281. Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960).
282. Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
283. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 963 (1948).
284. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). The outcome was judgment against all of the
defendants because they were unable, or unwilling, to explain the event. 93 Cal. App. 2d
43,208 P.2d 445 (1949).
285. See Gobin v. Avenue Food Mart, 178 Cal. App. 2d 345,2 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1960).
286. Gobin v. Avenue Food Mart, supra note 285.
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Also of obvious importance in this connection is the decision in
the Vandermark case,287 holding that the manufacturer cannot
delegate to the dealer the responsibility for the final "servicing" of his
product. Where this is applied, and any negligence of the dealer in
such "servicing" is to be charged to the manufacturer, the plaintiff's
proof against the latter is obviously greatly facilitated. Except in this
respect, there appears to be nothing in any of the strict liability cases
to indicate that the problems of proof will be dealt with in any
different manner than in those involving only negligence.
287. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964). See text accompanying notes 174-178 supra.
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